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INTRODUCTION
THE CASES surveyed in the following pages were de-
cided and the opinions published prior to January 1,
1993. Accordingly, the reader should pay careful atten-
tion to the possibility that some cases may have had sub-
sequent action taken by the courts modifying or otherwise
disposing of the legal issues discussed. Additionally,
while the cases have been listed under various subject
matter headings, many deal with multiple legal issues
which might be covered in a different section of the paper.
Finally, it is probable that noteworthy decisions were not
reported herein and we regret this oversight.
I. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSIDIARY
Gould v. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale ' involved
a wrongful death claim under a product liability theory
against the owner/operator, distributor and manufacturer
of a helicopter which crashed. The pertinent legal issue
1 23 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,349 (E.D. Wash. May 11, 1992).
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was whether a Delaware corporation, which was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation, which in turn
was wholly-owned by a foreign sovereign (France), quali-
fied for protection pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (FSIA)Y The court focused its analysis on
whether the Delaware corporation was "an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state."' 3 In effect, the court
found a conflict between the provisions of the FSIA and
the fact that the defendant distributor was a citizen of the
State of Delaware for purposes of establishing diversity
jurisdiction. The court dismissed defendants' arguments
regarding the similarity of interest between the two cor-
porations, along with the contention that the non-jury
provision of the FSIA should apply to all parties in the
case.' The court concluded that the claims against the
owner/operator and distributor would proceed with a jury
and the claim against the French manufacturer would be
tried by the court alone in a parallel trial.6
B. NATURE OF ACTIVITY
In Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 7 the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the meaning of "commercial activity" and
"direct effect" under the FSIA to determine whether the
district court had jurisdiction over Argentina in regard to
the issuance and trading of certain foreign bonds. The
court found that if the activity which was the subject of
this suit related to actions on the part of the foreign state
which were identical or similar to activities which could be
engaged in by a private citizen or corporation, the com-
mercial activity would be sufficient to allow jurisdiction
under the FSIA.9 According to the Court, the FSIA fo-
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1988).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1988).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1988).
5 Gould, 23 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,349, 18,352 (E.D. Wash. May 11, 1992).
6 Id. 18,353.
, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
' Argentina, 112 S. Ct. at 2166.
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cused on the nature, rather than the purpose or motive of
the activity.' 0 The Court then reviewed whether the man-
ner in which Argentina regulated the maturity dates on
the instruments constituted a commercial activity with a
"direct effect" in the United States, and found that be-
cause of the payment schedule it did. " ' Although the rele-
vance of the case in an aviation setting may be limited, the
opinion provides a good review of the history of the FSIA
and a current interpretation and adjudication of a foreign
sovereign's attempts at total preclusion of jurisdiction.
Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. The Philippines 12 in-
volved the purchase of an aircraft from the Republic of
the Philippines -by a Texas corporation. Following the
election of Corazon Aquino to the Presidency of the Phil-
ippines, the Philipine government created an agency de-
nominated as the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, which among other functions, had the re-
sponsibility of seizing purported assets of the Marcos re-
gime and selling them to recover funds for the
government. One of the assets seized was a Falcon 50 air-
craft that the Commission recovered from a Hong Kong
corporation, Faysound Ltd. The Philippine government
subsequently sold the aircraft to the plaintiff, Walter
Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. Distressed about the loss of its
property, Faysound successfully litigated the title and
ownership of the aircraft against Walter Fuller in federal
district court in Arkansas.
The instant lawsuit arose out of Walter Fuller's loss of
the aircraft and its claims in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas to recover this
loss. The claim focused on the contract between the
Commission and Fuller. In the contract, the government
of the Philippines agreed to defend and hold harmless
Fuller from all claims relating to its purchase of the air-
craft. The defendants attacked jurisdiction on several
,0 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)(1988).
11 Argentina, 112 S. Ct. at 2168-69.
12 965 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1992).
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grounds, but most specifically with the argument that the
exceptions to the FSIA did not apply to this sale and thus
there was no jurisdiction over either the government or
the Commission. As a fall-back position, the defendant
submitted that the doctrine of forum non conviens should
apply and the matter should be transferred to the Philip-
pine Court for adjudication. The district court judge 3
concluded that there was jurisdiction over both the gov-
ernment and the Commission.' 4 The defendant then ap-
pealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
The court of appeals concluded that there was in fact
jurisdiction over the Commission under the commercial
activity exception of the FSIA, but the record contained
insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction over the gov-
ernment.15 The court remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the government could be held
liable under an agency theory.' 6 The other arguments, in-
cludingforum non conviens, were overruled. 17
Arniba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos 18 presents a fascinating
factual scenario involving a claim in excess of
$1,000,000,000. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pro-
vided a lengthy opinion on burden of proof and the ap-
propriate discovery to be undertaken when analyzing
whether a defendant should receive immunity under the
FSIA based on a commercial transaction. Reviewing the
commercial activities exception to immunity, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had the burden of proof to
show not only that certain commercial activity on the part
of the sovereign took place in, the United States and had a
direct effect on, parties within the United States, but also
that the precise activity that comprised the basis of the
13 The Honorable Jerry Buchmeyer, a frequent participant at the Annual SMU
Air Law Symposium.
" Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d at 1375.
-. Id. at 1380-89.
16 Id. at 1380-83.
17 Id. at 1389-90.
it 962 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 413 (1992).
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cause of action provided a jurisdictional nexus with the
United States.' 9 Isolated or unrelated activities are not
sufficient. 20 The court concluded that when there were
genuine factual disputes as to the status of the foreign
government, discovery might be allowed; however, this
should be ordered circumspectively.2 1 While generalized
discovery should not be allowed, discovery carefully fo-
cused and limited to verifying the allegations necessary to
carry the burden of proof is appropriate. Ultimately, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged suffi-
cient commercial activities on behalf of the foreign state
to establish jurisdiction. 22 Thus, jurisdiction over the de-
fendant was not appropriate under the FSIA.
In Casalino v. Ente Ferrovie Dello Stato 23 the plaintiff sus-
tained injuries while riding a train in Italy. She fell and
was injured when the train changed tracks. The defend-
ant, which operated the train, contended that it was a pub-
lic entity created and operated by the Italian Government,
and thus, claimed immunity pursuant to the FSIA. Plain-
tiff submitted that while it may have been an entity of a
foreign state, the commercial activity exception 24 should
apply, rendering jurisdiction proper. Discovery estab-
lished that while the plaintiff could have purchased her
ticket from an agent of the defendant in the United States,
she actually purchased her ticket in Italy and she sustained
injuries in that country. The court therefore concluded
that immunity extended to the defendant and granted the
motion to dismiss.25
Fargo Weite Reisen v. Jamaica Vacations Ltd.26 involved a
German corporation that sued a wholly-owned subsidiary
11 Id. at 533-34 (citing Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos, 923 F.2d
380, 390 n.14 (5th Cir. 1991)).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 534.
22 Id. at 537. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
23 779 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
25 Casalino, 779 F. Supp. at 342.
21 790 F. Supp. 272 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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of the Government of Jamaica in federal court in Florida
under a breach of contract theory. The parties negotiated
and signed the contract in Germany. The contract in-
volved the promotion of tours from Germany to Jamaica.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss forforum non con-
veniens which was denied. While the defendant initially
failed to raise the immunity defense available under the
FSIA, it subsequently plead immunity in response to the
plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff contended that the de-
fendant waived its right to plead the FSIA as an affirma-
tive defense because it failed to raise immunity in its
motion to dismiss. The court held, however, that the de-
fendant's failure to initially raise the immunity defense did
not constitute waiver because the defendant pleaded im-
munity in its first "responsive pleading. '27 The court
then analyzed whether the matter should be dismissed
pursuant to the FSIA and granted the motion based on an
insufficient commercial nexus between the parties and the
United States. 28 The court also noted that allowing such
litigation would require the courts of the United States to
sit as international courts of claims.29
Gerding v. France30 provided a slightly different analysis
of the jurisdictional issue. The parents of an employee of
AT&T filed a lawsuit claiming damages under the Jones
Act, 3 ' Death on the High Seas Act3 2 and the general mari-
time law of unseaworthiness. The defendants were all
French. The decedent worked aboard a vessel involved in
laying and repairing underwater communication cables.
While at sea, the decedent, a diabetic, became ill and died.
The theory of liability was that the "Chef de Mission"
aboard the French vessel should have obtained medical
records on all personnel embarking on the mission. The
French defendants filed a motion to dismiss with support-
27 Id. at 275. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1988).
21 Fargo, 790 F. Supp. at 276.
21) Id.
-30 943 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
.1' 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
.2 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-67 (1988).
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ing documents and affidavits claiming that they were "for-
eign states" within the meaning of the FSIA, were not
engaged in commercial activity within the United States,
and were therefore entitled to dismissal.
On appeal, the court examined the record and refused
to hear delinquent protestations from the plaintiffs about
what discovery might have shown.33 Specifically, the court
concluded that once the motion to dismiss with support-
ing documentation was filed, the burden to prove jurisdic-
tion shifted to the plaintiffs and the allegations of the
complaint were simply insufficient to carry this burden. 4
The court discussed in some detail the restrictions that
the law placed on an appellate court when speculating as
to what discovery might have shown. It concluded that
failure to undertake discovery would not be considered
relevant and the ultimate ruling on the appeal would
come exclusively from the facts developed in the lower
court.3 5 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal.3 6
II. WARSAW CONVENTION3 7
A. INJURIEs/ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE
Walker v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 38 involved a motion by
Eastern requesting the trial court to reconsider its earlier
opinion denying Eastern's motion for summary judgment.
In the alternative, Eastern requested that the court certify
the matter for an interlocutory appeal 9.3  The thrust of the
opinion related to whether a plaintiff injured on an inter-
national flight, is precluded from making any claim for
damages under state law should its claim under the War-
saw Convention not be applicable. In this case, the court
found that the decedent had been on an internatinal flight
s' Gerding, 943 F.2d at 524-25.
34 Id. at 525-26.
-s Id. at 526-27.
.- Id. at 527-28.
.7 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
.' 785 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
[59
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but that his death did not qualify as "an accident."4 Ac-
cordingly, Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention was inap-
plicable. Eastern took the position that plaintiff had no
remedy since state causes of action should be precluded
from these claims. Thus, the question before the court
was whether the plaintiff could plead in the alternative a
state cause of action.
In an extensive opinion, the court stated that the
United States Supreme Court had twice declined to ad-
dress whether a plaintiff could institute, alternatively, a
state law cause of action where the injuriesproved not to
be covered by the Warsaw Convention. 4' However, the
court, relying on In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on
December 21, 1988412 concluded that the plaintiff's claim
was not limited to an action under the Warsaw Conven-
tion and that plaintiff could "plainly" institute an action
against the air carrier under state law causes of action.43
The court distinguished a number of cases where plain-
tiffs' claims were dismissed. It illustrated that in those
cases, the plaintiffs had sued exclusively under the Warsaw
Convention and had faild to seek alternative relief under a
state law cause of action.
Eichler v. Lufthansa German Airlines44 involved a passen-
ger allegedly injured while boarding an international
flight operated by defendant Lufthansa. She filed suit in
New York state court, but the defendant subsequently re-
moved it to federal court pursuant to the FSIA. The facts
indicated that the plaintiff was boarding a flight in Frank-
furt, Germany, bound for JFK when she stumbled over
luggage adjacent to the boarding stairs. Plaintiff con-
tended that her "accident" was in the course of boarding
the aircraft on an international flight and thus, was cov-
40 Walker, 785 F. Supp. at 1170.
41 See Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1059 (1985).
42 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
41 Walker, 785 F. Supp. at 1172.
44 794 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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ered by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.45 She
claimed entitlement to a ruling of absolute liability on the
part of defendant Lufthansa but agreed that her damages
could not exceed $75,000.
Whether or not Lufthansa was entitled to apply the
principle of comparative negligence, which was applicable
through Article 21 of the Warsaw Convention, repre-
sented the central legal issue.46 The defendant contended
that the contributory negligence laws of the forum state
(New York) applied, but the court relied on federal com-
mon law tort principles. Under those principles the court
cited general maritime law as discussed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in a line of cases leading
up to and including In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland,
on December 21, 19884 7 and concluded that the principle of
comparative negligence would be applicable.48
Li v. Quraishi49 presented a bizarre factual situation
where the district court analyzed the meaning of an acci-
dent for purposes of one passenger's claim for indemnity
regarding the initial claim of another passenger. On a
United Airlines flight from Tokyo-Narita to JFK, one pas-
senger allegedly urinated on a passenger-mother and her
two-year old child. The mother and child made claims
against the airline and passenger under the Warsaw Con-
vention and on theories of negligence and intentional
misconduct. The defendant passenger filed a claim for in-
demnification and contribution. United filed a motion for
summary judgment which was not opposed by the plaintiff.
Thus, the issue for decision by the court was whether the
4.- "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained . . . if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place ... in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking." Warsaw Convention of 1929, art. XVII, 49
Stat. at 3018.
Il "If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the
negligence of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provisions
of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Warsaw
Convention of 1929, art. XXI, 49 Stat. at 3019.
17 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
"I Eichler, 794 F. Supp. at 129-30.
41, 780 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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defendant-passenger was entitled to indemnity from the
air carrier if the plaintiffs were able to prove a case for
purely psychological injuries.
United pleaded a defense under Article 17, and the
court analyzed the defense in conjunction with Article 25
relating to intentional misconduct. 50 This was a some-
what different analysis than that undertaken by the United
States Supreme Court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd.51 In
that case the Supreme Court concluded that bodily inju-
ries under Article 17 did not include purely mental or psy-
chological injuries.52 It did not analyze what type of
injuries might be included if the air carrier's conduct was
intentional, The district court, analyzing Floyd, In re Air
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, 5 and In
re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,54 concluded
that Article 17's preclusion of recovery for purely psycho-
logical damages was not a limitation which was modified
by Article 25, even if willful misconduct could be
proven.55 Accordingly, the court granted United's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the urinating pas-
senger's cross-claim for indemnity.56
In Stovall v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 57 the plaintiff and her
mother were travelling on an international flight from
London to Minneapolis with an intermediate stop in Bos-
ton. The plane had arrived safely at Boston's Logan Air-
port and the plaintiffs disembarked to clear customs and
proceed to their final destination on a new aircraft. After
clearing customs, the defendant transfered the passen-
gers' luggage to the new aircraft and the passengers were
given tickets that entitled them to transportation aboard a
Massachusetts Port Authority bus to the domestic air ter-
51 Id. at 119.
51 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
52 Id. at 1502.
-3 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
-14 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
5. Li, 780 F. Supp. at 119-20.
.1; Id. at 120.
57 595 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. 1992).
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minal. In the course of the transportation, one of the bus
doors opened and both plaintiff and her mother fell from
the'stairway of the bus where they had been standing.
Both sustained injuries and the mother died as a result of
her injuries.
The case presented the issue of whether Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention made the defendant-airline
strictly liable for the injuries sustained pursuant to actions
by the independent contractor providing ground trans-
portation. After analyzing the facts pursuant to Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,58 the Massachusetts court found
that the defendant-airline did not require the plaintiff and
decedent to take that particular bus nor did it control
their transportation in any way between aircraft. 59 Thus,
the Massachusetts Port Authority rather than defendant-
airline exercised control over the two passengers.6 0 The
court concluded therefore that although this truly was an
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17, it occurred
outside the terminal building while the passengers were
on a public bus, thus the risk which ultimately material-
ized and caused the harm was not a risk of aviation.6 '
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, on February
24, 198962 provided yet another decision arising out of
the midair accident 'of United Flight 811, en route from
Honolulu to Australia. The court reviewed the interac-
tion of the Death on the High Seas Act" (DOHSA) and
the Warsaw Convention. The court previously had con-
cluded that a cause of action under DOHSA was a neces-
sary claim to be asserted by the plaintiffs under these facts
and DOHSA specifically precluded the availability of non-
pecuniary damages under general maritime law or under
state law.64 In this decision, the court resolved whether
- 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
.9 Stovall, 595 N.E.2d at 333.
- Id.
61 Id. at 333-34.
62 783 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1992):
s 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988).
61 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, 783 F. Supp. at 1267.
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the Warsaw Convention provided a basis for awarding the
non-pecuniary damages excluded by DOHSA.
In a detailed analysis of the Warsaw Convention and
DOHSA, the court ultimately held that although DOHSA
did not contain a survival provision, it did not specifically
preempt alternative statutory survival remedies.6 5 The
court concluded that the survival component of the War-
saw Convention action encompassed recovery for pre-
death pain and suffering. Thus, plaintiffs herein were en-
titled to recover for such damages through Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention, in spite of the general tenet of
DOHSA.66 The court also concluded that since plaintiffs
asserted claims under the Warsaw Convention, they
would be entitled to a jury trial, rather than being limited
to a trial by judge alone in accordance with admiralty
jurisdiction.67
The court in In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1,
198368 reviewed the same issue of whether plaintiffs
would be entitled to a jury during the damages phase of
the case, in light of the fact that there was an apparent
conflict between the provisions of DOSHA 69 and the War-
saw Convention. 70 The thrust of the airline's position was
that since the DOHSA claim was in admiralty, the plaintiff
should be precluded from having a jury trial. The court,
however, dismissed this argument on the basis' that a jury
triable survival claim was joined with the admiralty claim,
and thus, the admiralty claim was capable of being tried
by a jury as well.7'
Kleiner v. Qantas Airways, Ltd.72 enjoyed a long and fruit-
6. Id. at 1265 (including remedies contained in the Jones Act 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 688 (1988) and the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59
(1988)).
11 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii, 783 F. Supp. at 1265.
7 Id. at 1266 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h)).
- 798 F. Supp. 750 (D.D.C. 1992).
69 46 U.S.C. app. § 761-768 (1988).
70 In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 798 F. Supp. at 751.
71 Id. at 753.
72 No. 88 Civ. 8642, 1990 WL 80047 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1990), aft'd, 970 F.2d
895 (2d Cir. 1992).
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ful life in spite of a rather simple set of facts. The plaintiff
was a passenger on a flight to New Zealand and Australia
and allegedly suffered an adverse reaction from an insect
spray that was utilized immediately prior to arrival in both
countries. In a non-jury trial, the court concluded that the
plaintiff's reaction was idiosyncratic and thus, did not
constitute an "accident" within in the meaning of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention. 73 The judgment was ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
remanded for purposes of obtaining additional evidence
to determine whether the spraying was required by regu-
lation, how long the particular disinfecting program was
in effect, and finally, whether reports of adverse reactions
were so minimal as to constitute plaintiff's reaction as idi-
osyncratic. 4 Upon additional hearing, the trial court
granted a motion for summary judgment, concluding that
the injuries sustained were not compensable under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention and there was no other ba-
sis on which plaintiff could recover.7 5 This was appealed
for a second time and the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.76
Gonzalez v. TACA International Airlines77 is another case
questioning what type of injury constitutes an "accident."
The federal court in Louisiana was confronted with a
complicated sequence of events which allegedly led to an
angina attack suffered by a passenger during a flight. The
plaintiff contended that a flight attendant's spilling food
on him, serving him a beverage that contained a foreign
body in it, and requiring him to check six carry-on bags
lead to the angina attack which lasted for approximately
twenty to thirty minutes during the flight. Upon arrival of
the flight, the passenger claimed to have been hospital-
ized for approximately a month to treat the sequelae of
7. Id. at *1.
74 Id. at *2.
7 Id.
7, Id.
77 Civ. A. 91-0175, 1992 WL 142399 (E.D. La. June 18, 1992).
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the attack. The district court concluded that spilling food
and serving a beverage containing a foreign body consti-
tuted an "accident" within the meeting of Article 17.78
The court also concluded that requiring the plaintiff to
check his luggage was not an "accident" even though it
may have caused the plaintiff personal inconvenience and
emotional discomfort. 79 The court awarded the plaintiff
$5,000 for the bodily injury resulting from the spilled
food and adulterated beverage.8 0
Price v. British Airways8 I reached the conclusion that inju-
ries sustained by a passenger as a result of a fist fight with
another passenger did not constitute an "accident" for
purposes of applying the Warsaw Convention.8 2 The in-
juries were not related to the carrier's operation of the
aircraft because a fist fight was not a characteristic risk of
air travel.8 3 The court distinguished this activity from a
terrorist action or hijacking for which an air carrier might
provide appropriate security. 4
In Adler v. Malev Hungarian Airlines8 5 the court held that
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd8 6 was conclusive of the alleged
injuries raised by the plaintiffs in this case. The court rea-
soned that since the alleged injuries occurred during in-
ternational air travel, and were the result of an "accident"
which took place on the aircraft, the claim fell strictly
within the scope of the Warsaw Convention. 7 Because
the plaintiffs sustained only mental injuries, however,
which by case law had been strictly precluded from recov-
ery, the court held it would be impermissible to allow a
collateral claim to be made pursuant to state law.88 Ac-
"I Id. at *2.
79 Id.
$0Id. at *3.




No. 89 Civ. 8252, 1992 WL 15144, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1992).
$" 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
.7 Adler, 1992 WL 15144, at *3.
", Id. at *4.
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cordingly, a motion for summary judgment in favor of the
defendant airline was granted.89
In Chendrimada v. Air-India9° the plaintiffs sued under
the Warsaw Convention for injuries sustained as a result
of alleged confinement to the defendant's aircraft for
eleven and a half hours resulting from heavy fog at the
departing airport. The complaint failed to provide details
of the physical injury but the plaintiff contended that he
suffered from weakness, nausea, cramps, pain, anguish,
malnutrition, and mental injury. The court concluded
that if believed, these injuries were sufficient to constitute
an "injury," and the delay and alleged refusal to allow the
plaintiffs to leave the aircraft could constitute an "acci-
dent," as it was unexpected and external to the passen-
gers. 9' However, factual conflicts arose as to whether or
not the plaintiffs were actually forced to stay on board the
aircraft, so the court indicated that additional evidence
should be produced on these points in order to determine
whether an injury causing accident actually occurred.92
B. JURISDICTION
Pflug v. Egyptair Corp. 93 involved a claim for injuries to a
passenger sustained during a 1985 hijacking. While the
court gratuitously reviewed various issues that could have
been decided under the Warsaw Convention (injuries
during hijacking were caused by an "accident"),94 the
thrust of the case related to whether a subsidiary of a for-
eign airline constituted a "carrier" under Article 28. The
court concluded that Egypt Air Corporation was a mere
paper entity and the actual carrier involved in the interna-
tional transportation was Egypt Air, the state-owned air-
8s Id.
110 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
!I Id.
1 ld. at 1092-93.
'i 961 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1992).
. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'dper
curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
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line of Egypt, which was domiciled in Egypt.95
Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had
sued the wrong defendant and thus, granted a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.96
Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transport Co.97 involved the is-
sue of where a claim governed by Article 28 of the War-
saw Convention might be brought. The plaintiff-
passenger purchased a round-trip ticket from the defend-
ant to travel from Senegal to New York via Switzerland.
The outbound legs specifically listed travel dates,
although, the return portion was "open." Upon arrival in
New York, on the second leg of his trip, an object from
the overhead compartment allegedly fell out and struck
the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently filed a suit in
Texas state court that was removed to federal court pur-
suant to the Warsaw Convention. The district court dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.98
On appeal, the plaintiff attempted to distinguish his
case from controlling case law. First, the plaintiff argued
that since the return portion of the ticket was left "open"
and the completed portion of the ticket showed New York
as the final destination, jurisdiction should be established
in the United States. The court quickly dismissed this ar-
gument citing In re Alleged Food Poisoning Incident, March,
1984 99 and concluded that a round-trip ticket originates
and terminates at the same location.'00 The plaintiff then
argued that it was his intention at all times to have New
York as his final destination, and the only reason he
purchased the round-trip ticket was because it was less ex-
pensive than a one way fare. The court distinguished the
holding in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, on
May 9, 1987 101 and focused on the contract between the
95 Pflug, 961 F.2d at 31-32.
'; Id. at 32.
97 962 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1992).
I ld. at 388 (relying on FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)).
. 770 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1985).
"M Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 389.
101 760 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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parties, which in this case was the round-trip ticket.'
Finding that the ticket was unambiguous as to final desti-
nation, the court concluded that New York was merely an
interim stop and Senegal was the point of origin and des-
tination. 0 3 The only ambiguity in the contract was the
time of the travel, not the destination. The court also dis-
missed plaintiff's final argument that Swiss Air had an of-
fice in New York which should be considered its principal
place of business, concluding that Swiss Air was clearly
incorporated in Switzerland, which was its principal place
of business within the meaning of Article 28.104
Independent Air, Inc. v. Tosini 105 concerned the crash of a
flight attempting to land in the Azores, Portugal. The de-
fendants were the owner of the aircraft, and the lessor op-
erating the aircraft when it crashed. The trial court
entered an order finding the operator of the aircraft negli-
gent, but concluded that the limitations on liability con-
tained in the Warsaw Convention were not applicable.0 6
The appellate court reversed, holding that the company
which actually operated the flight should be considered a
carrier under the intent of the Warsaw Convention; to do
otherwise would frustrate the intentions of the partici-
pants at the Convention. 0 7 Accordingly, the court held
the defendants were entitled to limit damages under the
Warsaw Convention. 10 8
Bodner v. United Airlines, Inc. 109 involved a wrongful
death action resulting from the crash of United Airlines
Flight 585 traveling from Denver to Colorado Springs,
Colorado, which killed the plaintiff's decedent. The dece-
dent had made arrangements through American Express
to travel from Toronto, Canada, to Colorado Springs,
1112 Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 389.
I03 Id.
",4 Id. at 390.
"'5 600 So. 2d 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
I d. at 4.
107 Id. at 5.
108 Id. at 3.
Il, 23 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,509 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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Colorado, and return. The initial arrangements included
a flight from Toronto to Chicago with a change of planes
and a subsequent flight directly to Colorado Springs. The
tickets issued to the decedent contained the appropriate
conditions listed thereon, including advice that the War-
saw Convention might be applicable. On arrival at Chi-
cago, however, the plane for the next leg incurred a delay
leading to the presentation of a revised itinerary. The
changes required a stay overnight in Chicago with a flight
the next morning from Chicago to Denver and then from
Denver to Colorado Springs. The airlines provided the
decedent with a re-issued flight coupon containing the
original ticket number and the notation that it was "SOLD
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON PAS-
SENGERS COUPON OF ORIGINAL TICKET." There
was no change to the return portion of the trip from Colo-
rado Springs to Toronto.
While admitting that the original ticket and itinerary
constituted international travel, the plaintiff argued that
due to the change in the itinerary, the decedent was on a
domestic rather than an international flight at the time of
the accident and thus, the Warsaw Convention was not
applicable. The court disagreed, concluding that the de-
cedent remained an international traveler and the substi-
tuted ticket incorporated by reference the applicability of
the Warsaw Convention." 0 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the Warsaw Convention applied, but did not
preclude the plaintiff from making other contentions con-
sistent with the application of the Warsaw Convention."'
Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Singapore Airlines 12
involved the legal issue of whether the newly created
country of Singapore should be deemed by law to have
adhered to the Warsaw Convention. The court noted that
Id. 18,512-13.
I' Id. 18,514.
11 No. C 91-3858, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4589 (N.D. Cal, Mar. 27, 1992).
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Singapore was a signatory of the Hague Protocol," t3
which provided at Article XXIII that adherence to the
Hague Protocol constituted adherence to the Warsaw
Convention.It 4 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
Warsaw Convention applied to Singapore Airlines, which
the court deemed to be wholly owned by the country of
Singapore." 5 It was also noted that a similar decision in
regard to Singapore Airlines had been reached by another
court." 16 Finally, since the international travel originated
in Australia and proceeded to Singapore, the court con-
cluded that under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, jurisdiction was proper in either Australia or
Singapore, but not the United States." 7
C. CARGO/BAGGAGE CLAIMS
In Eisenkeit v. Nigeria Airways, Ltd. 118 the plaintiff origi-
nally brought an action in New York small claims court for
the loss of certain luggage during an international flight
on Nigeria Airways. The plaintiff apparently pursued the
defendant's claims procedures for a significant period of
time without success. The defendant finally advised him
to pursue his rights in litigation, which he did in a timely
fashion according to New York law, although more than
two years passed since the arrival of his flight. The dis-
trict court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Article 29, concluding that the
Warsaw Convention's two-year time limitation constituted
a condition precedent and was not affected by New York
law." 9 The court.did indicate that the plaintiff might have
a claim in fraud, but it was not the subject of the present
11 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371.
1,4 Nissan, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4589, at **5-6.
", Id. at **6-7.
116 Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 749 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd,
933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
17 Nissan, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4589, at *4.
I'l No. 91 C 3057 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2604 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Ho Id. at *2.
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litigation. 120
Arkwright-Boston Manufacturer's Mutual Insurance Co. v. In-
tertrans Airfreight Corp. 121 concerned an action brought by
underwriters against a warehouse owner seeking to re-
cover damages for goods shipped overseas that arrived in
a damaged condition. The warehouse owner joined the
air carrier claiming that Articles 11 and 18 of the Warsaw
Convention created a presumption that air carriers re-
ceive cargo in good order and condition; therefore, any
damages subsequently discovered were deemed to have
occurred during the period of the air carrier's responsibil-
ity for same. The goods in question were crated. It was
uncontested that there was no visible damage to the pack-
aged equipment until the crate was removed. The court
concluded that the air carrier could not be liable under a
presumption since damage to the goods could not have
been determined prior to accepting the shipment. 22
Lufthansa German Airlines v. American Airlines, Inc. 123 in-
volved a loss of cargo that was to be transported from
New York to St. Thomas. Plaintiff Lufthansa entered into
an agreement with a jeweler in Hong Kong to transport
gold jewelry with precious and semi-precious stones from
Hong Kong to St. Thomas via New York. Lufthansa sub-
contracted with American Airlines to transport the cargo
from New York to St. Thomas. The American flight in-
tended to transport the cargo direct from New York to St.
Thomas, departed before the goods were received.
American arranged alternative transportation without the
knowledge of Lufthansa. American .flew the jewelry to
San Juan, Puerto Rico, and subsequently transferred the
goods to a second carrier for transportation to St.
Thomas. While the initial air waybill indicated the inter-
national nature of the carriage and designated the goods
120 Id.
121 777 F. Supp. 103 (D. Mass. 1991).
122 Id. at 107 (citing D.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 736 F.2d I
(1st Cir. 1984)).
12, 797 F. Supp. 446 (D.V.I. 1992).
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as "high value", the agreement between American and
the subsequent carrier did not. The goods were lost.
Suit was filed and the court was presented with motions
for summary judgment. Lufthansa argued that it was enti-
tled to summary judgment because American's actions
constituted a material breach of contract, moving the dis-
pute beyond the ambit of the Warsaw Convention. The
breach occurred because the air waybill failed to desig-
nate any intermediate stops. The court concluded that
there were genuine issues of fact that needed to be re-
solved.' 24 The court did hold, however, that in the inter-
est of routine interpretation and enforcement of the
Warsaw Convention, the international nature of the
agreement and contractual voyage would be enforced
under the terms of the Warsaw Convention.1 5
American moved for summary judgment as well on the
basis that Lufthansa lacked standing to bring the action
because Lufthansa was not the real party in interest.
American further argued that the doctrine of champerty
barred the claim. Interpreting Articles 12, 13 and 14 of
the Warsaw Convention, the court concluded that Articles
14 and 15 would be construed broadly to permit parties
other than the named consignee or consignor to bring an
action under the Convention. 126 Under the broad con-
struction, the court denied American's summary judg-
ment motion. 127
Finally, the subsequent carrier, also named as a party,
had its motion for summary judgment denied on the basis
that material questions of fact existed concerning whether
it was a successive carrier under Article 1(3).
Bazzy v. RoyalJordanian Airlines 128 involved the loss and
damage of certain shipments of perfume on defendant
airline from Aman, Jordan, to JFK. The matter was re-
'24 Id. at 450.
2.1 Id. at 451 (adopting Rotterdamsche Bank & Another v. B.O.A.C. & Aden
Airways, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 154 (Q.B. 1953)).
126 Id. at 452.
127 Id.
121, 23 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,395 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1992).
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moved to federal court pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and defendant moved for dismissal on the
basis that the two-year statute of limitations in Article
29(1) of the Warsaw Convention time-barred the claim.
The court concluded that Article 29 was a condition pre-
cedent that amounted to an absolute time bar, and
granted the motion. 29
In Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 130
the court concluded that the Warsaw Convention applied
to a shipment of goods from the United States to Taipei,
Taiwan. The Executive Branch of the United States for-
merly recognized the People's Republic of China as the
legitimate government of China, and since the People's
Republic was a signatory of the Warsaw Convention, the
court concluded that Taiwan, as a portion of the People's
Republic of China, was bound by this action. 13 1 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the Warsaw Convention applied
to damage to goods shipped from the United States to
Taiwan. '3 2
In Rageb v. DHL Worldwide Express 133 the plaintiff con-
tended that he contracted with DHL to ship a package
containing dental supplies to Cairo, Egypt. Instead of tak-
ing four days as promised, however, it took sixteen days
to arrive. Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of
$10,000 for monetary losses, which included the value of
the package as well as overseas phone calls and incidental
expenses. DHL contended that it was not liable for any
damages because the airbill contained a disclaimer that
"DHL WILL NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES,
BE LIABLE FOR DELAY IN PICK-UP, TRANSPORTA-
TION, OR DELIVERY OF ANY SHIPMENT, REGARD-
LESS OF THE CAUSE OF SUCH DELAY." 134
1'2 Id. 18,397.
140 796 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
1, Id. at 1191.
132 Id.
133 23 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,486 (N.D. I1. Mar. II, 1992).
134 Id.
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DistinguishingJahanger v. Purolator Sky Courier,'3 5 the court
held that DHL failed to provide any explanation for the
delay, and thus would not be allowed to implement the
terms of the disclaimer. 36 The court concluded that the
limitation of liability applied, limiting the damages to the
declared weight of six pounds. 37 Accordingly, the court
entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$54.42. 138
D. LIMITATIONS
Onyeanusi v. Pan Am '39 concerned the notification re-
quirements set forth in Article 26(3). The facts of the case
indicate that the plaintiff's mother, a Nigerian and mem-
ber of the Ibo tribe, was visiting her son in Philadelphia
when she unexpectedly died. A funeral home arranged to
have the remains prepared and transported by Pan Am
from New York to Nigeria via France. The remains were
to leave New York on October 15 and arrive in Nigeria
two days later. On October 17, the estimated date of arri-
val, approximately 20,000 members of the Ibo tribe gath-
ered in anticipation of the body's arrival and a traditional
tribal funeral and burial.
For reasons that set forth in the opinion, the body did
not arrive until October 25. During the eight-day delay,
the son received conflicting reports from Pan Am and was
presented on one occasion with the remains of a "com-
plete stranger. ' ' 0 Further, when the remains ultimately
arrived on October 25, they were "damaged and decom-
posed." 14 ' Apparently, the authorities in France noticed
some damage to the container in which the body was be-
ing transported. The authorities allowed a French funeral
home to prepare the casket and rewrap the body; how-
615 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Rageb, 23 Av. L. Rep. 18,487.
137 Id.
138 Id.
3,9 52 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992).
140 Id. at 790.
141 Id.
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ever, when the body arrived in Nigeria, it had been
wrapped in burlap, which, according to the Ibo tribe's cul-
ture, indicated the person committed suicide. Further,
the body had been placed face down in the casket, which,
according to tribal culture, indicated a dishonorable
death.
The son filed suit against Pan Am, and the court
granted the defendant's summary judgment. 14 2 The basis
of the defense was that the plaintiff failed to provide ap-
propriate written notification in the time allowed, which
was seven days for damaged goods 143 and fourteen days
regarding delivery of goods. 44 CitingJohnson v. American
Airlines, Inc. , 14 5 and distinguishing Tarar v. Pakistan Int'l
Airlines, 146 the appellate court affirmed, concluding that
human remains must be classified as goods because they
can have a "significant commercial value."' 4 7 The court
felt it preferable to broadly interpret the Warsaw Conven-
tion rather than exclude human remains from the defini-
tion of goods.
Distribuidora Dimsa S.A. v. Linea Aerea Del Cobre S.A. 148 in-
volved the loss of video recorders during air transporta-
tion. The plaintiff contented that Article 8 of the Warsaw
Convention required certain information to be provided
in the waybills, failing which, the air carrier should be pre-
cluded from limiting liability under Article 9 of the War-
saw Convention. The two waybills in question set forth
the gross weight of the shipments and the number of the
pieces, but did not have information relating to the
method of packing, the particular marks or numbers on
the packages or the volume and dimensions of same. The
court concluded that the omitted information was "com-
142 Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 790.
143 Warsaw Convention of 1929, art. XXVI (2), 49 Stat. at 3020.
144 Id.
14. 834 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1987).
16 554 F. Supp. 471 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
147 Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 792 (explaining that medical schools purchase
cadavers).
141 785 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 976 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1992).
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mercially insubstantial or insignificant and non-prejudi-
cial"' 49 and, thus, the absence of this information was not
material to anyone in the chain of distribution.' 50 Accord-
ingly, the court ruled in favor of the air carrier and al-
lowed the limitation on liability. 15 1
In Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 152 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's de-
cision finding the evidence presented was sufficient to
allow the jury to find willful misconduct permitting dam-
ages in excess of those set by Article 17. The underlying
facts of Ospina involved the crash of an aircraft in 1986
when a bomb on board exploded on approach to Athens
airport. Evidence indicated that certain normal TWA in-
spection procedures were not completed when the pas-
sengers boarded the flight. The court relied on the fact
that while TWA may have failed to undertake certain nor-
mal inspection measures, this failure did not violate any
specific FAA requirement.153 Specifically, the court em-
phasized the fact that no other airline regularly performed
the detailed inspection and concluded that "the test for
willful misconduct is not 20-20 hindsight."' 5 4
In Vargas v. American Airlines, Inc. ,55 several passengers
allegedly were injured in the process of an emergency
evacuation of an American Airlines aircraft involved in in-
ternational travel. The court was presented with the issue
of whether the two-year statute of limitations under Arti-
cle 29 of the Warsaw Convention would bar the claim or
whether the defendant air carrier should be equitably es-
topped from asserting this defense. The thrust of the case
concerned the improper naming of the corporate defend-
ant. The court concluded that the air carrier had not un-
149 Id. at 51 (citing Exim Indus., Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 754 F.2d
106 (2d Cir. 1985)).
150 Id. at 50.
'.1 Id. at 51.
'5 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993).
'5- Id. at 37.
1 Id.
1.. 23 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,227 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1992).
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dertaken any deception in regard to its proper identity
and thus the court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, enforcing the time bar of Article
29.156
Trofi v. Qantas Airways, Ltd. 157 involved personal injuries
allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs on a trip from Rhode
Island to Australia when the Qantas aircraft encountered
turbulence. The injuries allegedly were sustained on May
15, 1988 and plaintiffs attempted service upon Qantas by
delivering the summons and complaint to the Rhode Is-
land Secretary of State on May 8, 1991. On October 16,
1991, a copy of the papers were mailed to the Qantas of-
fice in San Francisco, and on October 18, 1991, the plain-
tiffs took a default judgment. The defendant moved to
vacate the default judgment due to lack of personal juris-
diction pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.' 5 s The court concurred, finding that the purported
service on the Rhode Island Secretary of State did not con-
stitute valid service under the FSIA.159 Accordingly, the
default judgment was vacated. The court went on, how-
ever, to review the timeliness of the claim and concluded
that it was time-barred and thus, the defendant's motion
to dismiss was granted. 60
III. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. JURISDICTION
The plaintiff in Wood v. United States 161 was involved in
bidding on a Piper Embraer aircraft that the United States
Customs Service had seized. Prior to the beginning of the
auction, the plaintiff discussed the condition of the air-
craft with the auctioneer who warranted that the aircraft
would be issued an FAA airworthiness certificate. Based
15,1 Id. 18,229.
'.7 No. 91-0231B, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10183 (D.R.I. June 16, 1992).
',- 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988).
159 Id.
961 F.2d 195 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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on this understanding, the plaintiff entered a high bid of
$38,000.00 and tendered a $5,000.00 deposit. Thereaf-
ter, he was advised that the FAA would not issue an air-
worthiness certificate but, that, only a ferry certificate
would be issued, allowing him to either export the aircraft
from the United States or to fly it to a facility where the
aircraft would be dismantled. It was alleged that the mar-
ket value of the aircraft with an airworthiness certificate
was $140,000.00, but without such a certificate only,
$5,000.00.
The plaintiff filed suit in federal court in California al-
leging numerous claims, including damages under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 1 62 The matter subse-
quently was transferred to the Southern District of Florida
and then to the Court of Claims on the basis of absence of
subject matter jurisdiction. 63 This action was appealed
and the appellate court analyzed whether the actual claim
being made by the plaintiff sounded in contract or in tort
and, in particular, focused on whether specific perform-
ance could be accomplished. The court concluded that
the relief being requested was not applicable under the
FTCA since it needed to be controlled by contract law.' 64
Specific performance therefore could not apply, and the
court upheld transfer to the Court of Claims. 65
The plaintiff in Berkman v. United States 166 allegedly
slipped and fell on hydraulic fluid which had leaked from
a mobile transfer lounge at Dulles International Airport
and subsequently sued the FAA on the basis that it owned
and operated the airport facilities and thus, should be lia-
ble under the FTCA.'67 The trial court dismissed the
claim on the basis that the negligence, if any, rested with
an independent contractor which was under contract to
clean and maintain the airport facilities. The Fourth Cir-
16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1988).
'63 Wood, 961 F.2d at 197.
' Id. at 199.
165 Id. at 200.
1,1 957 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1992).
167 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1988).
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cuit Court of Appeals concluded that sovereign immunity
under the FTCA excludes liability based solely on the
negligence of an independent contractor regardless of
what state law would hold. 68 The court also held that an
agency theory provided no basis to have imputed the neg-
ligence of the independent contractor to the FAA.' 69 The
appellate court remanded the case, however, to determine
whether there was any independent indirect negligence of
the FAA. 170 Apparently, there was insufficient informa-
tion on the record to rule as a matter of law that no in-
dependent negligence on the part, of FAA employees
existed.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. United States '71 involved the
crash of a helicopter which was operated by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The
passenger, a civilian employee of NOAA, filed suit against
the manufacturer, seller and lessor of the helicopter and
the claim subsequently was settled. Thereafter, the de-
fendants sued the United States under the FTCA claiming
entitlement to indemnity on the basis that the pilot, a fed-
eral employee, was negligent in the manner in which he
operated the helicopter. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of a motion for sum-
mary judgment in favor of the government concluding
that employers were granted immunity under the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Act 172 and therefore the claims
for implied contractual indemnity and non-contractual in-
demnity were barred. 73
The decedent in Reiser v. United States 174 was a 33 year
old single female who was piloting an aircraft which
crashed, and the injuries she sustained subsequently
brought about her death. The Administrator of her Es-
11-s Berkman, 957 F.2d at 113.
69 Id. at 113-14.
170 Id. at 114-15.
17, 967 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 964 (1993).
172 Id. at 308 (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990)).
'71 Id. at 308-09.
114 786 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Il. 1992).
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tate, her father, filed a wrongful death action under the
FTCA contending that the negligence of air traffic control
personnel caused her death. The case was tried to the
court alone, which applied the Illinois law. Under Illinois
law, elements of damages include the loss of the dece-
dent's love, affection, care, attention, companionship,
comfort, guidance and protection. 75 Further, the individ-
uals entitled to recovery were the "next of kin" which in-
cluded the decedent's parents and four siblings. 176
The court concluded that the contributory negligence
of the decedent was ten percent and thus, proceeded to
evaluate the damages due the estate. In a detailed opin-
ion reviewing the value of the decedent to her family, in-
cluding descriptions that she was the "glue that held the
family together,"'' 77 the court concluded that the mother
and father each sustained an annual loss in the amount of
$8,750 and multipled this amount by their life expec-
tancy. 78 The siblings sustained annual losses ranging
from $8,750 to $10,000 and, using similar life expectancy
numbers, calculated a total net award in the amount of
$1,814,493.30.179
Koohi v. United States 180 involved the death of the plain-
tiff's decedent as a result of the firing of a missile from the
USS VINCENNES, a United States Navy cruiser, on July
3, 1988. The missile struck a civilian Iranian Airbus. Two-
hundred and ninety persons aboard the aircraft died.
Claims were made under the Federal Tort Claims Act
against the United States and certain defense contractors
involved with the Aegis Air Defense System, the system
responsible for firing the missile. The court took judicial
notice of the "tanker war"'' 8 ' and concluded that suits
against the United States based on claims "arising out of
171 Singh v. Air Ill., 520 N.E.2d 852 (1988).
171 Reiser, 786 F. Supp. at 1335.
177 Id. at 1338.
178 Id. at 1339.
171 Id. at 1339-40.
' 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
"' Id. at 1330 n.1.
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combatant activities of the military or naval forces ... dur-
ing time of war" '82 were prohibited. Accordingly, the
tanker war although not declared, was part of larger hos-
tilities and would preclude recovery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act against the United States and shield de-
fense contractors from liability.
B. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
In Budden v. United States ' 3 the crash of a helicopter am-
bulance in inclement weather resulted in the death of the
pilot and two nurse passengers. The claims against the
United States related to the negligent provision of
weather data to the pilot over the telephone by an FAA
flight service specialist. The lower court concluded that
the cause of the accident was the pilot's flying into deteri-
orating weather conditions and the actions of the flight
service specialist were appropriate. The appeal dealt with
the issue of whether the flight service specialist was under
a duty to advise the pilot of forecasted low ceilings. The
transcript of the taped telephone briefing included a re-
quest by the pilot for information relating to any "signifi-
cant weather moving through that area in the next hour
and a half."' 18 4 The appellate court concluded that this
was a very specific inquiry regarding weather conditions
along the intended route and the failure of the flight ser-
vice specialist to fully brief the pilot in response to this
inquiry constituted negligence. 8 5 Accordingly, the lower
court decision in favor of the United States was reversed
and the case remanded on the issue of causation. On re-
mand the court also addressed whether the pilot's con-
duct precluded recovery despite a conclusion that the
actions of the flight service specialist constituted
negligence. 8 6
12 Id. at 1333 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1988)).
"1, 963 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1992).
1,4 Id. at 189.
'85 Id. at 193-94.
18 Id.
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Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey 18 7 involved an action brought by Pan
Am against the United States and The Port Authority for
damage to the engine and hull of a DC-10 aircraft. The
damage occurred when the pilot was required to place the
engines in reverse thrust because of a near collision with
sanding equipment on one of the taxiways. The crew of
the DC-10 indicated that they first noticed the sanding
equipment on the grassy part of the airport near the inter-
section of two taxiways, and when the aircraft was approx-
imately 70 to 100 feet from this intersection, the sand
trucks started in motion and sped across the path of the
aircraft. The pilot initially applied brakes, but because of
the icy condition of the taxiway, the brakes did not effec-
tively slow down the aircraft and thus, the pilot put the
engines into reverse thrust. Damage to the engines and
hull resulted.
The plaintiff presented the case against the Port Au-
thority to a jury and argued a parallel non-jury trial
against the United States. At the completion of the plain-
tiff's case, the court granted judgment in favor of both
defendants on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to
prove a prima facie case.' 88 The court, in its findings, con-
cluded that the advice given by the air traffic controller
that sand trucks were in the vicinity of the taxiway suffi-
ciently alerted the crew that there may be a requirement
to stop quickly.' 8 9 The version of the air crew regarding
the actions of the sanding crew was apparently not
credible.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court.' 90 The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff
presented enough evidence for the jury to decide that the
Port Authority negilently maintained the runways and op-
",7 787 F. Supp. 312 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 995 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1993).
" Id. at 313.
" Id. at 319.
J Pan Am. World Airways, Inv. v. Port Auth., 995 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1993).
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erated the sand trucks.' 91 The Second Circuit, however,
agreed with the district court's order which refused to
qualify Pan Am's expert witness. 92 The Second Circuit
reversed the district court and remanded the case for a
new trial.' 9 3
Pettorini v. United States 194 involved the crash of a Piper
aircraft piloted by an individual qualified for flight solely
under visual flight rules. The evidence reflected that the
flight was commenced in marginal VFR conditions and
shortly thereafter the weather deteriorated to IFR condi-
tions. The pilot never declared an emergency and at no
time did the air traffic controllers ever fail to provide any
assistance requested by the pilot. Although the air traffic
controllers may have become aware of the pilot's difficul-
ties operating his aircraft, the court concluded that their
failure to take more aggressive action did not constitute a
proximate cause of the crash. 95 Accordingly, the court
entered judgment in favor of the United States. 1 96
Nakajima v. United States 197 was a claim under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act by the estate of a pilot of a helicopter
involved in a mid-air collision. The collision occurred
when an airplane travelling above and behind the helicop-
ter collided with it. The court concluded that although
the helicopter pilot had a duty to "see and avoid" the air-
plane, this constituted a physical impossibility, based on
the position of the aircraft. The court, therefore, found it
inappropriate for the helicopter pilot to take extraordi-
nary measures looking for something that he did not
know to have been there.' 98 The court distinguished
United States v. Miller,' 9 as applying to an overtaking air-
9 Id. at 9.
192 Id. at 10.
193 Id.
' 23 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,397 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 1992).
". Id. 18,405.
,9, Id. 18,406.
197 965 F.2d 987 (11 th Cir. 1992).
1,,' Id. at 989.
"i 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
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craft and thus, found it inapplicable to the decedent.20 0
Barnard v. United States 20' involved the crash of a twin
engine aircraft following an encounter with adverse
weather conditions. The crash resulted in two deaths.
The court analyzed the duty of air traffic controllers to
provide weather information. Citing Barbosa v. United
States,21 2 the court concluded that the pilot in command
was responsible for the manner in which the aircraft was
flown and this responsibility included being aware of, and
avoiding, dangerous weather conditions.203 Specifically,
the pilot in question did not ask for any additional assist-
ance from the controllers and apparently either mishan-
dled the plane or encountered weather so severe that it
exceeded the plane's limitations. The court concluded
that the evidence was insufficient to show that the air traf-
fic controllers either violated their duties or took action
which brought about the crash of the aircraft.
C. CUSTOMS AGENTS
Attallah v. United States20 4 arose out of the robbery and
murder of a courier in 1982. The decedent was transport-
ing currency and other assets on behalf of the plaintiff in
the approximate amount of $694,000. Two United States
Customs Service agents illegally abducted the courier,
stole the assets and murdered him. Approximately ten
days later, the body of the courier was found, however it
was not until approximately four and a half years later that
the customs agents were indicted. The plaintiff filed this
suit against the United States seeking to recover damages
for the theft of the property.
The United States initially defended on a theory that
the claims were time-barred in that they were not filed un-
til more than two years after the alleged tortious conduct.
2- Nakajima, 965 F.2d at 989.
201 24 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,125 (D. Colo. 1992).
202 811 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1987).
203 Id. at 1445.
204 955 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1992).
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The appellate court easily dealt with this defense, con-
cluding that the discovery rule applied and that plaintiff
had insufficient knowledge or reason to know of the cause
of action until the criminal indictments were returned,
and thus, the claim was not time-barred.° 5 The appellate
court did conclude, however, that the actions of the
agents were clearly beyond the scope of their employment
on behalf of the United States government and thus, the
tortious conduct could not be attributable to the United
States.206 The court also dismissed the plaintiff's argu-
ment that other customs agents were negligent in not per-
forming their duties properly by failing to uncover the
malicious intentions of the culpable agents.20 7 The appel-
late court concluded that the discretionary function ex-
ception applied and thus, the claim should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 20 8 The appellate
court affirmed the court's granting of summary judgment
on behalf of the United States. 0 9
In a detailed factual review of the actions of certain cus-
toms agents at Boston's Logan Airport, the court in
Adedeji v. United States210 concluded that the United States
had undertaken tortious conduct against an arriving air-
line passenger without probable cause and awarded her
$215,000. The facts involved the arrival of this Nigerian
national on a round trip Boston to Nigeria vacation.
Upon her return from Nigeria with one suitcase, she was
questioned by a customs agent. Based on what were con-
sidered to be non-responsive or evasive answers, she un-
derwent progressive interrogation and searches by
various agents. Ultimately agents strip-searched her and
transported her to a local hospital where her body cavities
were visually inspected, ultimately undergoing abdominal
x-rays. In spite of the interrogation and searches, no evi-
205 Id. at 780.
206, Id. at 780-82.
207 Id. at 782-84.
208 Id. at 783.
2- Atta~lah, 955 F.2d at 768.
2 o 782 F. Supp. 688 (D. Mass. 1992).
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dence of any contraband was ever found. Consequently,
she filed suit shortly thereafter. The court concluded that
due to the conduct of the customs agents, the plaintiff had
sustained post traumatic stress disorder which required
psychiatric treatment.2 1' The court awarded $200,000 for
past and future pain and suffering and $15,000 for past
and future psychiatric care.21 2 The court declined to
award attorneys' fees.2 ' 3
IV. INSURANCE
A. CONTRACT LANGUAGE
In Truck Insurance Exchange v. Waller214 the passenger in a
private aircraft owned and operated by the insured was
injured in the crash of the aircraft. The passenger suc-
cessfully recovered a verdict against the owner/operator.
The plaintiff then attempted to collect the monies under a
farm insurance policy issued to the owner/operator. The
insurance policy had certain exclusions relating to the op-
eration of aircraft. The insurance company filed a declar-
atory judgment action and its own insured admitted that
no coverage existed under the policy. The passenger
maintained standing, however, and contested this inter-
pretation of the policy.
The general language of the policy excluded coverage
for bodily injury arising from the "ownership, mainte-
nance, operation, use, loading or unloading of. . .air-
craft. ' 215 In regard to employees, however, injuries were
excluded only if arising from the operation or mainte-
nance of the aircraft. This "buy back" was deemed by the
court only to apply to employees, while the general exclu-
sionary language of the policy relating to all aspects of the
operation of an aircraft applied to third parties such as the
211 Id. at 701.
212 Id. at 703.
21.4 Id. at 703 n.29.
214 828 P.2d 1384 (Mont. 1992).
21. Id. at 1386.
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plaintiff/passenger. 21 6 Accordingly, the court affirmed
the lower court's decision granting summary judgment in
favor of the insurance company.21 7
In Miller v. Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. 21 1 the plain-
tiff's decedent was an employee of a construction com-
pany. The company owned a Beechcraft Queen Air that
it used for business purposes. The decedent, through his
employment status, received certain accidental death ben-
efits; however the pertinent language of the policy ex-
cluded coverage when the contributing cause of the death
involved certain aeronautic activities unless the decedent
was a passenger on a commercial aircraft. The decedent
died as a result of a crash of the company Queen Air. The
insurance company denied coverage under this exclusion
on the basis that the company aircraft did not constitute a
commercial aircraft. The court concluded that the lan-
guage was not ambiguous and that it was clear under the
facts of this case and the manner in which the Queen Air
was operated, that it did not constitute a commercial air-
craft and thus, coverage was not provided. 9
The insured/defendant in United States Fire Insurance Co.
v. Mobley220 entered into a contract with the City of Ma-
dras and Jefferson County, Oregon, to manage a munici-
pal airport. Pursuant to the agreement between Mobley
and the government bodies, he leased the airport prem-
ises "to carry on the responsibilities of airport man-
ager. ' ' 22' The premises were to be used "only for a
commercial operation of aircraft, 2 22 including, however,
"pilot training, aircraft rental, FAA certified air charter
and FAA certified maintenance and inspection. ' 22' The
lease further stated that the landlord-governments "shall
216~ Id.
217 Id.
219 791 F. Supp. 858 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
219 Id. at 861.
220 784 F. Supp. 782 (D. Or. 1992).
221 Id. at 783.
222 Id. at 783-84.
22. Id. at 784.
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provide airport general liability insurance, hangar
keeper's liability insurance, premises liability insurance
for fuel operation, and insurance required on jet fuel
truck with the Tenant as an additional named insured. 224
Finally, the lease provided that Mobley's "business is en-
tirely separate from the initial business of the City of Ma-
dras and the County of Jefferson. ' 2 25 The municipalities
did not intend flight instruction to be provided as part of
the municipalities' service; however, they did require that
Mobley provide this service on his own.
On June 9, 1987, a student pilot landed at the airport
with her flight instructor. The instructor had become ill
during the course of the flight and required hospitaliza-
tion upon landing. The student pilot sought permission
from Mobley, a certified flight instructor, to fly solo to her
home airport. Mobley endorsed the student pilot's log
book and upon return to her home airport, the student's
aircraft crashed short of the runway and she sustained se-
rious injuries. The insurance company filed a declaratory
judgment action claiming it had no duty to defend Mobley
under the policy. The insurance policy expressly covered
acts of Mobley that resulted from using the premises for
operations "necessary or incidental" to the use of the mu-
nicipal airport.226 The court believed that the language of
the policy was ambiguous and interpreted it against U.S.
Fire, concluding that reasonable minds could find cover-
age for Mobley's actions as the fixed base operator, in-
cluding his activities as a certified flight instructor. 27
Accordingly, the court held that U.S. Fire had a duty to
defend Mobley in the underlying tort litigation.228
In Dinocenzo v. Aitken 229 the Arizona appellate court, ap-
plying Alaska law, found that an airplane carcass, used as
a source for spare parts, was part of the business opera-
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 785.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 786.
221, 827 P.2d 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
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tions of a carrier and should be covered under its aviation
premises liability policy. 230 The underwriters took the posi-
tion that the carcass was an aircraft, in spite of the fact
that it did not have wings, engines or instruments and
thus, its loss was specifically excluded. The court used the
definition of "aircraft" in the dictionary23' and concluded
that the carcass in question may once have been an air-
craft, but when it was no longer capable of flight, it could
not reasonably be classified as such.232 As a result, cover-
age was found under the premises liability policy. 233
R.L.I. Insurance Co. v. Kary23 4 involved a declaratory
judgment action claiming that the spouse of the insured
pilot should not be able to recover under a policy because
her marital relationship specifically excluded her from re-
covering for injuries sustained in the accident. The perti-
nent policy language stated that it did not insure for any
bodily injury to the "insured" which further was defined
as including "the spouse of any person named in Item 1, if
that spouse resides in the same household as the per-
son." 23 5 The injured spouse contended that since her
husband and another insured had been lumped together
in the policy as "insured" and "you," and she was not the
spouse of the other individual, the definition was ambigu-
ous and should be construed against the insurer. She also
argued that since interspousal immunity in tort actions
had been abrogated in Kansas, such exclusionary attempt
was contrary to public policy. The court found the lan-
guage unambiguous and excluded the claim made under
the precise language of the policy. 23 6
United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United Coconut
2s0 Id. at 479.
231 Id. The dictionary referenced by the court defined "aircraft" as "any
machine or device, including airplanes, helicoptors, gliders and dirigibles capable
of atmospheric flight." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 27 (1969).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 779 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Kan. 1991).
235 Id. at 1302.
236 Id. at 1303.
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Chemical, Inc. 237 involved the notice requirements, under
the war risk clause of the policy.238 The insured owned
and operated a Dassault-Brequet Falcon 50 Landplane in
Southeast Asia, which was registered under the laws of the
Philippines. Pursuant to an Executive Order of the Philip-
pine government, the Falcon was sequestered, and
though the record is not clear, apparently was released
several months thereafter. Approximately ten months af-
ter the sequestration order, the insured filed a claim
under the policy declaring a "loss" of the aircraft. The
underwriters filed suit contending that the ten month de-
lay in giving notice was, as a matter of law, an unreasona-
ble amount of time, and thus, no coverage should apply.
This specific notice requirement of the policy provided
that the insured was required to provide written notice of
a loss "as soon thereafter as possible. 2 39 The court con-
cluded that precisely what reasonably amounted to "as
soon thereafter as possible" was a question of fact, and
thus, denied the motion for summary judgment, submit-
ting that the question must be decided by a jury.240 The
reader should note a related case discussed previously in
this paper.24 '
B. DAMAGES
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Pacific Southwest
Airlines242 involved a declaratory judgment action to de-
termine whether coverage existed under a policy of insur-
ance issued to defendant Pacific Southwest Airlines. A
commercial airline pilot, formerly employed by Pacific
Southwest Airlines (PSA), made a claim for personal inju-
2,17 No. 87 Civ. 5684, 1992 WL 122787 (S.D.N.Y., May 22, 1992).
2.8 The policy provided insurance coverage against war risks, defined as "Cap-
ture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detention or the consequences thereof or of any
attempt thereat, or any taking of the property insured or damage to or destruction
thereof.., by any Government or governmental authority or agent." Id. at * 1.
23) Id.
240 Id. at *4.
241 See Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 965 F.2d
1375 (5th Cir. 1992).
242 786 F. Supp. 867 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
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ries and emotional distress that he allegedly suffered in
the course of his employment due to exposure to a harm-
ful chemical routinely used as a rain repellant on the air-
craft which he operated. The matter was tried in a
California state court and the jury returned a verdict
against PSA in the amount of $100,000 in compensatory
damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. U.S. Air
was the successor of PSA by merger and, in this capacity,
was involved in the litigation.
One issue in the declaratory judgment action was
whether the California Insurance Code 243 prohibited in-
demnification of punitive damages in successor liability
cases. A subsidiary issue related to a claim of estoppel on
the basis that the underwriters did not fully inform U.S.
Air of certain conflicts of interest relating to the law firm
which it had retained to defend U.S. Air and review the
coverage issue. In a detailed analysis, the court con-
cluded that the California law clearly prohibited indemni-
fication of punitive damages in successor liability cases
where the merger put the successor on notice that it was
purchasing subject to the predecessor's liabilities or
where the predecessor was a significant, identifiable por-
tion of the successor. 244 The court emphasized that the
theory of punitive damages punishing the wrongdoer was
consistent with denying U.S. Air's claim that insurance
coverage should be applicable.245
The second aspect of the case related to the fact that
the underwriters retained a law firm to represent U.S. Air
in the underlying tort action and retained the same firm as
coverage counsel. While a clear conflict of interest ex-
isted, the court went further to analyze whether the un-
derwriters should be estopped from denying the coverage
under these circumstances as being against public pol-
241 CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972) (stating that "[a]n insurer is not liable for
a loss caused by the wilfull act of the insured").
244 Pacfic Southwest Airlines, 786 F. Supp. at 871.
245 Id.
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icy. 24 6 Returning to the California Insurance Code, the
court concluded that the underlying policy considerations
of punishing the wrongdoer took precedence over this
potential estoppel and thus, the public policy argument
prevailed, and the court denied that the underwriter
should be estopped.247 Accordingly, the court held U.S.
Air liable for the entire $2,000,000 in punitive
damages248
The underlying facts of Avemco Insurance Co. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co. 249 related to the crash of a Cessna 180 that was
owned and operated by a Mr. Goodfellow and insured by
Avemco. One of the injured passengers sued Cessna,
which brought a third-party action against the owner-op-
erator. Another injured passenger also made a claim
against the owner-operator, who, through Avemco, set-
tled the claim for the policy limits of $102,500. Thereaf-
ter, Avemco instituted this litigation against Cessna
claiming entitlement to contribution or indemnification
for the monies it paid on the settled passenger claim.
Cessna initially took the position that since Avemco was
subrogated to the claim of its insured, and the insured
failed to crossclaim against Cessna in the underlying liti-
gation, Avemco should be deemed to have waived any
such entitlement. The court concluded that it was not the
owner-operator who possessed the claim for indemnifica-
tion but rather the insurance company, which was acting
as a surety rather than a subrogee. 250 Accordingly, the
owner-operator did not have a claim for indemnity but
rather this rested solely in the hands of the insurance
company, which was not a party, and thus not able to
make such a claim in the original litigation. The instant
claim for contribution or indemnity was therefore not
waived.
24, Id. at 873.
247 Id. at 872.
24 Id.
24, 780 F. Supp. 788 (D. Utah 1991).
2511 Id. at 790.
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Cessna next argued that the release entered into be-
tween the passenger and the owner-operator and Avemco
was such that it did not release Cessna from the claim of
the passenger and thus, there was no right to contribution
or indemnification. Cessna admitted in the litigation that,
had it been sued by the passenger, it would have raised
the terms of the release as an affirmative defense in pre-
cluding any further payment to that passenger. The court
therefore concluded that the release discharged Cessna
from any liability to the passenger and therefore, the
claim for contribution or indemnity was appropriate.2 5" '
The final aspect of the decision related to whether pre-
judgment interest would be appropriate, and the court in-
dicated that this was not a personal injury claim per se, but
rather one in which the amount of damages was fixed and
under Utah law,2 52 prejudgment interest would be
recoverable.253
C. PILOT ISSUES
Safeco General Insurance Co. of America v. Davis 254 involved
the issue of coverage regarding the pilot warranty provi-
sion of the policy. The aircraft in question was to be used
for agricultural flying. The policy did not provide cover-
age while the aircraft was in motion "unless there was a
pilot at the controls who met the requirements of the Ae-
rial Applicator Pilot Standards. 2 55 The accident which
was the subject of the insurance coverage dispute oc-
curred when the pilot was unable to start the aircraft from
the cockpit and attempted to do so by manually rotating
the propeller. The aircraft ultimately started; however,
before the pilot could return to the cockpit, the plane ran
into a utility pole and sustained significant damage. The
insureds took the position that the propeller constituted
2' Id. at 791.
252 Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989).
253 Cessna Aircraft, 780 F. Supp. at 791.
254 No. CA 91-253, 1992 WL 103726 (Ark. Ct. App., May 6, 1992).
255 Id. at * 1.
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"controls" for purposes of the alleged exclusion and the
coverage should be available. In the alternative, the lan-
guage was ambiguous and coverage should be decided by
a jury. The trial court allowed the matter to proceed to
the jury verdict which found that there was a pilot at the
controls of the aircraft at the time of the accident. 256 The
appellate court affirmed.2 5 7
In A.D. Desmond Co. v. Jackson National Life Insurance
Co. 258 the plaintiffs' decedent had been the named insured
under a life insurance policy issued by the defendant, and
the plaintiff sought coverage following the death of the
decedent when the decedent crashed in a recently
purchased experimental aircraft. The underwriters de-
nied coverage on the basis that the decedent had made
material misrepresentations in his application for life in-
surance, particularly in regard to his past experience re-
lating to flying ultra-light planes. The plaintiffs
contended that the questionnaire, which was part of the
policy, contained ambiguous language, and any inconsis-
tencies in the answers provided by the decedent should
not be concluded to be material misrepresentations;
therefore coverage should apply.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the
questionnaire, including subsequent questionnaires re-
quired to be filled out, were ambiguous in that a layman
would not be able to ascertain precisely what was required
to be divulged to the underwriters.25 9 In particular, the
evidence showed that the decedent had flown ultra-lights
for six years before the accident but, the answers to the
questionnare never revealed this fact. A hazardous activi-
ties questionnaire covered ultra-light flying whereas an
aviation activities questionnaire inquired as to flying expe-
rience. Taking this into account, in a light most favorable
to the decedent, the court concluded that the information
2 Id. at *2.
257 Id. at *4.
2,8 585 N.E.2d 1120 (1992).
259 Id. at 1124.
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provided in response to this specific question was not ma-
terially misleading and thus, the defendant underwriters
were responsible for the death benefits. 2 °
D. DUTIES
In Dempsey v. Associated Aviation Underwriters261 plaintiff
brought a state court action against the manufacturer of
an aircraft involved in an accident along with the operator
of the aircraft and other defendants. The manufacturer
entered into a joint tortfeasor release with the plaintiff for
$300,000, and the state court action proceeded against
the other defendants. Following settlement and receipt of
the funds, the plaintiffs alleged that they discovered infor-
mation concerning the existence of a draft service bulletin
which should have been produced in discovery prior to
the settlement. The plaintiffs contended that had they
been aware of this document, the settlement value of the
case against the manufacturer would have been greatly
increased.
They commenced a federal court action thereafter to
retain the settlement proceeds of $300,000 and receive
additional damages because of the alleged wrongful non-
disclosure of the draft service bulletin. The plaintiffs also
named as defendants in the federal action the underwrit-
ers of the manufacturer and the claims manager handling
the account. The parties concluded that Pennsylvania law
was applicable and the court ruled that the powerful pub-
lic interest in settlements was such that it was imperative
the settlement in this case should be enforced.2 62 Of
some note was the fact that plaintiffs were attempting to
retain the $300,000 and to obtain an additional $1.7 mil-
lion dollars in compensatory damages and punitive dam-
ages in excess of $25 million dollars.
Of further interest, however, was the analysis of the
claims against the underwriters and claims manager. The
260 Id.
261 141 F.R.D. 248 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 977 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992).
262 Id. at 249.
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court determined, through evidence, that the manufac-
turer had an arrangement with a nine figure retention for
both losses and defense costs which were applicable to the
plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the negotiations between
Cessna's counsel and the plaintiffs' counsel had no finan-
cial bearing on the underwriters' exposure. Thus, the
motion to dismiss on behalf of both was granted.263 Fi-
nally, the court commented on the "apparent blood feud"
between the underwriters and plaintiffs' counsel .2  In re-
viewing the Rule 1 1 motion for sanctions, the court de-
nied the cross-motions. 65
V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. WARNINGS
Williamson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.266 was a complicated fac-
tual and legal case involving the crash of a Piper Malibu
resulting in injuries and two deaths. Initially, the litiga-
tion proceded against the manufacturers of the aircraft
(Piper) and the engine Teledyne Continental Motors
(TCM). Plaintiff joined additional parties, including the
United States and Parker-Hannifin (Parker), the manufac-
turer of the stand-by vacuum pump. After significant dis-
covery, TCM settled with the personal injury plaintiffs for
a total of $12.5 million and then sought contribution and
indemnity from the other defendants and third-party de-
fendants. The trial proceeded with TCM producing evi-
dence in support of a products liability theory against
Piper and Parker and a negligence theory against the air
traffic controllers. Ultimately, the court directed a verdict
against TCM on its indemnity claim, but submitted the
contribution claim to the jury.267 The jury returned a ver-
dict apportioning liability with forty-one percent to TCM,
forty-seven percent to Piper and twelve percent to
263 Id. at 252.
2- Id. at 253.
265 Id.
2 968 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1992).
21,7 Id. at 382.
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Parker.268 The court denied the claim against the United
States. 269 Post-trial motions were denied, an order on the
verdict was entered, and Parker appealed on the basis
that, under Pennsylvania law, a component manufacturer
could not be found strictly liable for an alleged failure to
provide written instructions to the product manufacturer
(Piper) regarding the manner in which the pump should
be installed.27 °
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit analyzed
Pennsylvania law and, contrary to Parker's contentions,
concluded that Parker was more than a mere manufac-
turer of a component and distinguished the facts of this
case from recent Pennsylvania decisions.2 7' In fact, the
court recognized that TCM had articulated its case against
Parker on a failure to warn theory as well as a defect in the
design of the pump. TCM contended that the engine fail-
ure was brought about by a leakage of engine oil caused
by the improper design of the stand-by vacuum pump and
the inadequate installation instructions Parker provided
to Piper. On this basis, Parker was more than a mere
component manufacturer since the stand-by vacuum
pump was made specifically for use by Piper on the
Malibu. The Court affirmed the judgment entered by the
lower court sustaining the verdict.272
Of additional interest in this case is that shortly after
the judgment was entered, Piper filed for relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and TCM thereafter
filed a motion to require Parker to assume a larger por-
tion of the shortfall created by Piper's bankruptcy. The
court of appeals did not rule on TCM's request to mold
the verdict, but rather indicated that the trial court should
act on this request. As of this date, no action has been
268 Id.
269 Id. at 383.
270 Id.
'27 Jacobini v. V. & 0. Press Co., 588 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1991); Mackowick v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 575 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1990); Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag
Aktiengesellschaft, 564 A.2d 1244 (Pa. 1989).
272 Williamson, 968 F.2d at 387-88.
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taken by the trial court, although initially, it indicated that
if jurisdiction was returned to the district court it would
likely grant such a motion and mold the verdict. The po-
sition of TCM is that it should receive credit for fifty per-
cent of the monies owed by Piper or, in the alternative,
Parker should be required to pay twelve percent of the
Piper share based on the jury's finding that Parker was lia-
ble for twelve percent of damages sustained.
In Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 273 a Beech Musketeer
was rented and flown from Alabama to Illinois where it
ultimately ran out of fuel and, in the course of its landing,
killed the pilot, one passenger and seriously injured a sec-
ond passenger. The 'aircraft was manufactured by Beech
in 1967. Suit was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas which, under a choice of law
analysis, determined that the law of Indiana would apply.
In particular, Indiana had a ten year statute of repose for
a products liability cause of action. 74 Defendant, Beech
contended that the statute was applicable and, the claims
were barred. Plaintiffs contended that the pilot/operator
manual that Beech published in December 1979 should
be considered as a replacement part and thus, the ten-
year statute of repose did not begin to run until 1979.
It was the factual theory of the plaintiffs that the infor-
mation provided in the handbook was defective and mis-
represented the amount of usable fuel within the aircraft.
Since the evidence showed that the cause of the accident
was insufficient fuel, the handbook clearly was instrumen-
tal in causation. Accordingly, when the new handbook
was issued in 1979, a new ten-year period began to run.
The court reviewed the replacement part theory and con-
cluded that it was not applicable as the case still amounted
to a failure to warn, which Indiana law held was within the
ten-year statute of repose.2 75 The plaintiffs also argued
that the law of Kansas should not apply the Indiana stat-
273 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991).
274 Id. at 1218.
275 Id. at 1220.
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ute of repose since it employed a "discovery rule." This
argument also was denied by the Court.27 6
B. DAMAGES
Butchkosky v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.277 involved the
crash of a helicopter during a sight-seeing tour and the
application of the "economic loss rule" under Florida law.
Citing East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc. 278 the court distinguished the facts of this case.2 79
While ordinarily economic losses are not recoverable in a
tort action, when there is no contractual remedy available
to a plaintiff who suffers such a loss, then economic losses
between parties could be established through the filing of
an action in tort under a product liability theory of
recovery. 280
In Walton v. Avco Corp.28' plaintiffs' decedents were
killed in a helicopter crash which occurred when the en-
gine seized in mid-flight following the failure of the oil
pump due to a previously known defect. The oil pump
was a component of the engine which was manufactured
by Avco Corporation (Avco), and which was incorporated
into the helicopter, manufactured and sold by Hughes
Helicopter, Inc. (Hughes). Over two years prior to the
crash, Avco issued a service instruction to Hughes advis-
ing the helicopter manufacturer of the defect in the oil
pump and detailing a procedure for correcting the prob-
lem at the next scheduled overhaul. However, Hughes
did not advise the helicopter's owner or its authorized ser-
vice centers about the problem, and the defect in the oil
pump had not been corrected at the time the helicopter
was overhauled thirteen months after Avco issued the ser-
vice instruction.
276 Id. at 1226.
277 784 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
278 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
27, Butchkosky, 784 F. Supp. at 883.
280 Id. at 884-85.
28, 610 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1992).
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Avco settled with plaintiffs prior to trial and obtained
releases which specifically preserved its right to seek con-
tribution from Hughes. Following trial, the jury deter-
mined both Avco and Hughes were strictly and primarily
liable to plaintiffs. The jury found that the engine manu-
factured by Avco was defective in design, and that such
defect was a substantial contributing factor in causing the
accident and the resulting deaths of plaintiffs' decedents.
The jury also determined that Hughes' failure to warn the
helicopter's owner and its authorized service centers was
an independent design defect and a substantial contribut-
ing factor to the accident and the resulting deaths. How-
ever, the jury awarded damages to plaintiffs in amounts
which were less than the settlements obtained from Avco.
The trial court thereafter granted Avco's post-trial motion
seeking contribution from Hughes and awarded Avco
one-half the jury verdict. The court denied plaintiffs'
claim to receive a portion of the jury verdict from Hughes.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania initially
upheld independent liability by Hughes based upon the
failure of Hughes to warn its service centers and those
who purchased its helicopters of the known defect.2 82
The court concluded that the fact that Avco, and not
Hughes, built the defective engine did not relieve Hughes
of its duty to warn.283 The duty began with the incorpora-
tion by Hughes of the defective engine into its helicop-
ters. 284 Accordingly, the court held Hughes was not
entitled to indemnification from Avco. 285
The court then addressed to whom Hughes owed its
share of the damages. In that regard, the court noted a
settling joint tortfeasor has a right to contribution against
a non-settling joint tortfeasor only where the settling
tortfeasor discharges the liability of the other joint
282 Id. at 460.
28.4 Id. at 459.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 460.
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tortfeasor.8 6 Since the releases entered into by Avco and
the plaintiffs did not also release Hughes from liability,
Avco was not entitled to contribution toward the settle-
ments from Hughes, and plaintiffs could obtain from
Hughes its pro rata share of the verdict.287 Lastly, the
court concluded that Hughes was responsible to plaintiffs
for one-half the verdict since Hughes and Avco were
strictly liable to plaintiffs and thus, contribution between
the joint tortfeasors could not be based upon the princi-
ples of comparative fault.28 8
C. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
The personal injury claims in Lewis v. Babcock Industries,
Inc. 2s9 involved the crash of an Air Force F- 11 while op-
erating out of Lakenheath, England. Plaintiffs sued Bab-
cock, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics for
personal injuries sustained by the pilot when he ejected
from the aircraft in the self-contained crew escape mod-
ule. The facts indicated that on descent, the forward re-
positioning cable of the module broke, causing the crew
members to sustain injury upon landing. Further, the
cable apparently broke due to corrosion. The defendants
filed motions for summary judgment contending that the
government contractor defense established in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.29° precluded liability regarding
design defects in military equipment if the defendants
could show that: "(1) the United States approved reason-
ably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed
to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equip-
ment that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States. ' '29' Defendants contended that they com-
286 Id. at 461.
287 Id. at 461-62.
211 Id. at 462.
289 No. 88 Civ. 1120, 1992 WL 142751 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1992), aft'd, 985 F.2d
83 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993).
2- 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
291 Lewis, 1992 WL 142751, at *4.
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plied with the three prong test of Boyle; however, the
plaintiffs argued to the contrary.
Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the second el-
ement was not met since the cable failed, indicating that it
did not comply with the general performance require-
ments. That is, because there was an accident, it must
have been brought about by the failure of the product to
perform in accordance with the specifications. The court
dismissed plaintiffs' contention and concluded that no
performance specifications would knowingly be allowed
by the government which could result in an accident. 92
To equate a product failure with the failure to comply
with the military specifications was not the test under
Boyle.2 93 The court examined the evidence in this case and
concluded that the Air Force was well aware of certain
corrosion problems with the cable.294 Accordingly, the
defendant satisfied this element of the test, and the mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted. 95
D. CHOICE OF LAW
In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19,
1989296 was yet another decision arising out of this 1989
accident. The district court denied plaintiff flight attend-
ants' motions for summary judgment. 9 7 Analyzing the Il-
linois choice of law principles,298 the court concluded that
the claims against the engine manufacturer, General Elec-
tric, were governed by the law of Ohio, the place where
the allegedly defective fan was manufactured.2 99 Simi-
larly, the claims against the aircraft manufacturer were
governed by the law of California where it manufactured
292 Id. at *8.
293 Id.
2-4 Id. at *9.
295 Id.
- 781 F. Supp. 1307 (N.D. Il1. 1991).
2W Id. at 1313.
298 See Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. 1970).
'- In re Air Crash Disaster, 781 F. Supp. at 1310.
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the aircraft. 0° So deciding, the court went on to conclude
that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding
causation and intervening cause and thus, the motions for
summary judgment were denied.3 0 '
E. EVIDENCE
Western Helicopter Services, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp.302
involved a petition to amend or alter an order granting a
motion for summary judgment based on newly discovered
evidence. Previously, a motion for summary judgment
had been granted on the basis that the plaintiff would be
unable to prove that the accident product was manufac-
tured by the defendant. Thereafter, plaintiff's expert exe-
cuted an affidavit indicating that after testing some
additional rotor blade forks and' comparing the findings
with those regarding the accident, he was able to conclude
that the accident product was manufactured by the de-
fendant. The court reviewed the three-prong test to allow
the relief and concluded that the plaintiff had shown that
the evidence: (1) existed at the time that the summary
judgment was granted; (2) could not have been discov-
ered through due diligence; and (3) was of such import
that if it had been brought to the court's attention earlier,
it would have changed the disposition of the motion for
summary judgment.3 0 3 Concluding that the plaintiff had
carried its burden of proof, the court opened the judg-
ment and allowed the matter to proceed on the merits. 4
VI. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
A. PREEMPTION
The plaintiff's decedent in Howard v. Northwest Airlines,
3-o Id. at 1313.
301 Id.
302 777 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Or. 1991).
I Id. at 1545-46 (citing Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.
1990)).
3- Id. at 1546.
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Inc. 305 was to travel from Houston to Louisville with a
stopover and change of planes in Memphis. Due to the
decedent's poor health, the defendant was advised that its
representatives would need to meet and assist the passen-
ger in his change of planes. Apparently this was not done
and the passenger remained on the continuation of the
flight to Newark, New Jersey. At that point it was deter-
mined that the passenger needed medical care, and he
was admitted to a local hospital. His condition deterio-
rated, and he was subsequently transferred by air-ambu-
lance from the Newark hospital to one in Louisville. He
died a few days later. Plaintiff sought recovery for the
wrongful death of the decedent due to the negligence of
the defendant in its failure to meet and assist the decedent
in his transfer to the appropriate flight and its failure to
provide quality medical care in Newark. Defendant
moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the Federal
Aviation Act30 6 specifically preempted all state law claims
against airlines that relate to airline carrier services. The
court concluded that the claims against defendant related
to airline carrier services and were preempted. 7
Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc. 30 involved a citizen of
Great Britain who allegedly was injured aboard an Ameri-
can Airlines flight from New York to Washington D.C.,
when a tire on the aircraft deflated. Suit was brought in
the state court of Texas and removed pursuant to federal
question jurisdiction 30 9 on the basis that the claim was
subject to the Federal Aviation Act.3 10 Removal was not
accomplished on diversity grounds, 3 1 and thus, the court
concluded that since diversity was not asserted in a timely
305 793 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
306 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).
-07 Howard, 793 F. Supp. at 132 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox,
897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990)).
301, 776 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
3- 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
310 Stewart, 776 F. Supp. at 196 (relying on Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386 (1987)).
31- 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
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fashion, this ground was waived. 1 The court then ana-
lyzed the issue of whether the Federal Aviation Act pre-
empted state law claims such as the one pleaded in the
instant case and concluded that the allegations of failing
to properly maintain the aircraft did not equate with
"services. ' 1 3 Differentiating these allegations from those
in Trans World Airways, Inc. v. Mattox, 1 4 the case was re-
manded to the Texas state court.
Sunbird Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp.s1 involved
a class action suit on behalf of all owners of Beech aircraft
with Pratt & Whitney PT6A, gas turbine engines that in-
corporated an allegedly defective Bendix pneumatic fuel
control unit design. The second amended complaint al-
leged fraud, deceit, strict liability, negligence, breach of
express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, con-
cert of action, civil conspiracy, fraudulent concealment,
and willful, wanton and outrageous conduct in violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). 1 6 The specific issue before the court related
to whether the Federal Aviation Act preempted plaintiffs'
claims and provided exclusive jurisdiction. Defendants
contended that the plaintiffs' claims constituted an imper-
missible collateral attack on the certification of the aircraft
and engine, and the relief requested at least preliminarily
required administrative action by the FAA; thus, the court
lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.
The court performed a detailed analysis of the charac-
terization of the relief requested by the plaintiff and em-
phasized the fact that the second amended complaint
dropped the request for a court ordered change in the de-
sign of the fuel control unit. Accordingly, the specific re-
lief amounted to compensatory and punitive damages
including diminution of the value of the aircraft as a result
112 Stewart, 776 F. Supp. at 1196.
-1s Id. at 1198.
314 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990).
"1 789 F. Supp. 360 (D. Kan. 1992).
316 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
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of the alleged design defect. The court concluded, there-
fore, that the causes of action and relief requested by the
plaintiffs, did not create an irreconcilable conflict with the
responsibilities of the FAA, including its desires to protect
those who either fly in, or are affected by, the operation of
aircraft. Further, the fact that the FAA certified the air-
craft was not dispositive but merely relevant as to whether
the design of the fuel control unit was defective.
A second order in the same litigation denied the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the counts of fraud and de-
ceit, RICO, civil conspiracy and fraudulent concealment
concluding that each count had been pleaded with suffi-
cient particularity. 1 7 Citing Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 9(b), the court concluded that the allegations were
specific enough to give notice to the defendants and allow
them to conduct appropriate discovery." 8
Finally, on June 10, 1992, the court entered another or-
der granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's pur-
ported cause of action asserting a violation of federal
common law.31 9 The court concluded that aircraft prod-
ucts liability law was not an area of uniquely federal inter-
est. 326 This case was between private parties and did not
involve the rights and duties of the United States; there-
fore, there was no basis for creating a federal cause of
action.3 '
Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc. 3 2 2 concerned a claim by
certain members of the defendant's frequent flyer pro-
gram. The plaintiffs claimed that retroactive changes in
the program, which diminished and restricted the benefits
accrued, constituted a breach of contract and violated
3,1 Sunbird Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 789 F. Supp. 364, 366 (D.
Kan. 1992).
, ld. at 366 (citing Markovich v. Vasad Corp., 617 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa.
1985)).
-119 Sunbird Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., No. Civ. A 89-2181-V
1992 WL 167279 (D. Kan. June 10, 1992).
120 Id.
321 Id. (citing Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)).
2 589 N.E.2d 533 (1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992).
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state consumer fraud and deceptive business practices
statutes.323 The relief requested consisted of money dam-
ages and injunctive relief preventing any retroactive
changes to the program. American Airlines initially re-
moved the case to federal court on the grounds that it
raised a federal question, however, the case was re-
manded to state court on the basis that the complaint set
forth causes of action cognizable under state law. On re-
mand, the defendant moved to dismiss because the claims
relating to the defendant's rates and services were pre-
empted by the Federal Aviation Act. On certified appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court, it was held that the injunc-
tive relief sought constituted state interference with
American Airlines' operations and that such requested ac-
tion would be preempted. The remaining causes of action
for breach of contract and fraud could be pursued in state
court. However, the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently
vacated the decision for further consideration by the
Supreme Court of Illinois in light of Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. 32 4
In Morales the United States Supreme Court based its
ruling on a permanent injunction precluding the attor-
neys general of 50 states, certain territories, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia from attempting to enforce various
guidelines relating to allegedly deceptive fare advertising
by the airline industry. The Supreme Court concluded
that the attempts by the states involved areas preempted
by the Airline Deregulation Act. 5 While the purported
guidelines did not create any new laws or regulations, the
requirement for disclosures and restrictions on advertis-
ing clearly impacted on airline business activities and di-
rectly conflicted with the preemptive nature of the Airline
Deregulation Act.
-21 Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 815, 505/1-505/12 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
34 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
3,2. Id. at 203.
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Miller v. Northwest Airlines 326 involved the detention of a
passenger prior to boarding a domestic air flight when se-
curity personnel noted a cigarette lighter shaped like a
hand gun in his attache case. While the facts were unclear
as to whether the passenger was "under arrest," the legal
issue involved whether the Federal Aviation Act 27 pre-
empted the state law claim for this tortious act by security
personnel. The court concluded that the allegations of
the complaint were sufficient to set forth a negligent and
intentional wrongdoing on the part of the airline security
personnel and returned the complaint to the trial court
for further proceedings. 328
In Harris v. American Airlines, Inc. 329 a first-class passen-
ger aboard a flight from Dallas, Texas, to Portland, Ore-
gon, overheard another passenger make racially
derogatory remarks toward her. She filed suit against
American Airlines for violating the Oregon Public Accom-
modations Act, 3 ° for intentionally inflicting severe emo-
tional distress and for negligence. While the court
concluded that the Federal Aviation Act did not preclude
the pleaded cause of action, no evidence existed that the
air carrier violated this state act because the remarks were
made by a passenger rather than an airline employee.
Further, once the flight attendant became aware of the ap-
parent intoxicated state of the offending passenger and
his remarks, she served no additional alcoholic beverages.
The plaintiff's emotional distress claim failed because
providing alcoholic beverages is insufficient to support
such a claim. Finally, the economic damages claim could
not be supported solely by the alleged emotional injuries.
326 602 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
3217 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988).
328 Miller, 602 A.2d at 789.
329 24 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,156 (D. Or. 1992).
110 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1991).
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VII. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
A. ENFORCEMENT
The central issue in Gallagher v. National Transportation
Safety Board 3 3 was whether the procedure in which a
blood sample maintained from withdrawal to analysis in
the laboratory constituted an appropriate chain of cus-
tody. The facts indicated that while the plaintiff prepared
for flight, an FAA inspector detected alcohol on the pilot's
breath and, after notifying local officials of the airline, re-
moved the plaintiff from the flight and took him to a med-
ical clinic to draw a blood sample. The medical clinic
subsequently submitted the sample to a laboratory, how-
ever, the technician who prepared the sample, prior to
shipping it to the laboratory, did not comply with local
chain of custody instructions regarding its submission.
Ultimately, the test did show an elevated blood alcohol
level, and the FAA issued an Emergency Order of Revoca-
tion of the plaintiff's Airman Certificate. The revocation
was based on a violation of a regulation which prohibited
a crew member from performing his duties with a blood
alcohol level in excess of .04 percent.3 2
The plaintiff appealed the order and, at a subsequent
hearing, the administrative law judge concluded that the
handling and packaging of the blood sample did not qual-
ify as a proper chain of custody and refused to consider
the analysis as evidence. He concluded that there was no
other evidence to prove the blood alcohol level and re-
versed the emergency order. The FAA appealed to the
full National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which
reversed and remanded on the basis that the administra-
tive law judge should have considered the totality of the
evidence to determine whether the blood analysis would
be sufficient enough to consider. With these instructions,
the administrative law judge reconsidered, but concluded
that the chain of custody had been broken and once again
is, 953 F.2d 1214 (10th Cir. 1992).
'3 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a)(4) (1992).
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reversed the emergency order. On a second appeal, the
NTSB concluded that the reliability of the analysis was
sufficient to be considered and, since the plaintiff had not
contested its reliability, the emergency order should be af-
firmed. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the revo-
cation as being based on substantial evidence.333 The
court also dismissed the plaintiff's contentions that the
NTSB's failure to dispose of the appeal within the pre-
scribed time limit divested the NTSB of jurisdiction to
complete its appeals process.334
The FAA in McCarthney v. Busey 335 revoked the Airman's
Certificates of seven pilots based on intentional falsifica-
tion of official records. The pilots subsequently chal-
lenged the action on the basis that the NTSB had not
disposed of the appeal within 60 days. The court of ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff
failed to establish the timeliness defense because the pi-
lots were required to show both that the rules required
action within a specific period and that the rules specified




Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach 33 7 involved pro-
tracted litigation regarding Long Beach's attempts to reg-
ulate air traffic at its municipal airport. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down the city ordinance solely on
the grounds that it did not provide adequate notice to en-
sure protection of important interests held by the air-
lines.3 38 Of note is the inapplicability of attacks on the
33 Gallagher, 953 F.2d at 1215.
334 Id.
135 954 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1992).
33, Id. at 1152.
337 951 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1991).
331 Id. at 981.
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ordinance on grounds of federal preemption, 3 9 imper-
missible burden on interstate commerce, 4 ° violation of
equal protection,3 4 ' and capricious interference with legit-
imate governmental concerns were held inapplicable. Ac-
cordingly, the decision seems to provide support for the
legal position that a municipality might significantly cur-
tail air traffic at its airport if proper notice of reductions or
changes is made with an appropriate opportunity for an
advance hearing.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee3 42
involved the constitutional issue of whether an airport fa-
cility's regulation prohibiting solicitation in certain areas
of the terminal violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights and were subject to declaratory and injunctive re-
lief.3 43 The regulations promulgated by the Port Author-
ity of New York and New Jersey forbid repetitive
solicitation of money or distribution of literature within
the terminal. Areas outside the terminal were not in-
cluded in this prohibition. Chief Justice Rehnquist, on
behalf of the Court, concluded that an airport terminal
could not be considered to be a public forum and thus,
the traditional right to gather on public streets did not
control the activity within an airport terminal.34 4 The
Court also noted that the terminal did not fit into the
characteristics of a public forum as its principal purpose
was not the free exchange of ideas. Rather, the clear pur-
pose of an airport terminal was to contribute to efficient
air travel and it was rare that the design intent included a
purpose for solicitation and distribution activities. 4 5
Through this evaluation the Court concluded that the
Port Authority need not show a compelling state interest
339 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
340 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
341 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
342 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
343 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
L44 ee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)).
4-5 id. at 2706-07.
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in the regulation, but need only satisfy a reasonableness
standard. Accordingly, regulation could be enforced. 34 6
In Jacksonville Port Authority v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. 47
the car rental company unsuccessfully challenged an air-
port access privilege fee imposed on off-airport car rental
companies. The court concluded that the fee was not a
tax, but rather a user fee which was appropriately charged
for the use of the roads built and maintained by the Air-
port Authority pursuant to its charter and consistent with
the public interest. 348
City of New Orleans v. City of Kenner 49 involved the New
Orleans Aviation Board plan to construct certain im-
provements to its airport for which it obtained approval
from the FAA as well as federal funding for certain as-
pects of the project. Hearing of the proposed construc-
tion, the neighboring City of Kenner, in which part of the
airport was situated, believed that the proposed construc-
tion may have an adverse impact on it. Its city counsel
adopted a resolution that precluded any expansion of the
airport without the express approval of Kenner. New Or-
leans filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court
asking that Kenner be enjoined from preventing the ex-
pansion as agreed to between New Orleans and the FAA.
In a detailed opinion, the court concluded that merely en-
tering into a contract with the FAA did not allow New Or-
leans to ignore or circumvent the local government entity
that had jurisdiction over the ground on which the expan-
sion would be made.3 50 The court held there was no sub-
ject matter jurisdiction which allowed this case to be
brought in federal court and dismissed the case.3 5 1 The
346 Id. at 2708.
341 600 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
341 Id. at 1165; see also Enterprise Management, Inc. v. Huntsville-Madison
County Airport Auth., 601 So.2d 897 (Ala. 1992).
-4,1 Civ. A. No. 91-4107, 1992 WL 21744 (E.D. La.,Jan. 28, 1992), vacated, 971
F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1992).
35o Id. at *4.
-1 Id. at *6.
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decision was subsequently vacated by the court of appeals
for the Fifth Circuit on August 6, 1992.
B. DUTIES
In Duncan v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority3 52 the
plaintiff's decedent, a member of the Oklahoma Air Na-
tional Guard, was involved in an exercise in which re-
quired him to rapel approximately seventy-five feet from a
helicopter. The exercise was conducted at Forbes Field
which was vacant property owned by the Metropolitan
Topeka Airport Authority. One of the members of the as-
sault team accidentally cut the rope being utilized by the
decedent and the injuries he sustained when he contacted
the ground brought about his death. The sole cause of
action against the Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority
related to its duty to provide emergency medical person-
nel during the course of the drill. The court granted a
motion for summary judgment on the basis that no duty
existed, either explicit or implicit, in allowing the exercise
to take place on the vacant property and thus, as a matter
of law, no basis existed on which to establish liability
against the defendant airport authority. 3 3
Queen City Aviation, Inc. v. City of Allentown3 54 involved a
claim by a Fixed Based Operator (FBO) which had lost a
contract to provide certain services for the municipal air-
port. A complaint was filed in federal court alleging that
Allentown violated the FBO's civil rights. The undis-
puted facts indicated that the plaintiff was the exclusive
FBO at the airport from 1981 through 1991 and, thereaf-
ter, the City issued a Request for Proposals to lease the
airport to a full service FBO. Two bids were received and
the plaintiff's was not selected. A lawsuit followed and
the district court granted a motion to dismiss concluding
that the plaintiff was no more than a jilted customer who
3-1 No. 91-1146-K, 1992 WL 42914 (D. Kan. Feb. 10, 1992).
3.53 Id. at *2.
.. 4 Civ. A. No. 91-7776, 1992 WL 131148 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1992), aff'd, 993
F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1993).
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accused the city and its new partner of duplicity. Accord-
ingly, the complaint was dismissed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 55
IX. COMMERCIAL
A. BANKRUPTCY
In re Pan American Corp.35 6 related to a bankruptcy Chap-
ter 11 proceeding in which the debtors petitioned to re-
move to federal court certain Florida state court actions.
The underlying facts related to the Lockerbie, Scotland,
crash of Pan American Flight 103 on December 21, 1988.
In this complicated procedural battle involving fifty-five
plaintiffs, the defendants attempted to utilize the air car-
rier's Chapter 11 status to transfer the state court actions
to federal court in New York. Each of the plaintiffs had
filed state and federal court actions in Florida, and the de-
fendants intended to have the actions in Florida trans-
ferred to the Southern District of New York where Pam
Am's petitions for reorganization were pending. Further,
pursuant to multi-district litigation court procedures, the
cases subsequently would be transferred to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
The presumed underlying motive of the defendants was
that ChiefJudge Platt of that court previously had entered
some favorable rulings regarding punitive damages in re-
lation to the Warsaw Convention. 57
The Pan Am defendants moved in the Southern District
of New York, where the bankruptcy case was pending, for
an order transferring the Florida state court actions to the
Southern District of New York.3 58 The district court, in
reviewing the requested transfer, concluded that it should
abstain from the requested transfer in accordance with
355 id. at *2-4.
-6 950 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1991).
15, Id. at 843 n.5 (citing In' re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December
21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991)).
3." See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988).
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federal law.3 59 The thrust of its decision was that the
transfer merely would lead to more delay and expense in
resolving the litigation and thus, it believed it was prefera-
ble for the parties to have the cases remain in Florida
where they could be litigated in the Florida courts. 6 °
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
lower court's denial to transfer, utilizing an abuse of dis-
cretion standard. In reviewing the bankruptcy law and the
doctrine of pre-emption, the court concluded that there
should be an initial presumption to transfer the action to
the forum of the insolvency in order to better preserve the
assets of the debtor.36 ' Since the Lockerbie crash in-
volved federal rather than state law, the transfer to the
federal court in New York should be carefully considered.
The court remanded the case to the lower court to review
the facts with a presumption against abstention.36 2
The plaintiff in TPI International Airways, Inc. v. FAA 3 63
was in Chapter 11 and filed this adversary proceeding
seeking money damages against the FAA based on im-
proper activities relating to the revocation of the plain-
tiff's certification and authority from the Department of
Transportation to engage in flight operations. The com-
plaint claimed that the fines imposed by the FAA on plain-
tiff in the amount of $810,000 were unsupported by
evidence and should be stricken. Secondly, because of
the activities of the FAA and the Department of Transpor-
tation in refusing to allow the plaintiff to conduct flight
operations, the plaintiff had sustained further monetary
damages.
The court concluded that the claims sounded in tort
and analyzed whether the activities of the FAA constituted
Queen City Aviation, Inc. 950 F.2d at 843 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1)
(1988)).
-~ Id.
361 Id. at 845.
162 Id. at 848. One of the cases (Rosenkranz) involved a crew member and thus,
was not subject to the Warsaw Convention. The appellate court, therefore, af-
firmed the lower court's decision regarding that claim in refusing to transfer it. Id.
s16 141 B.R. 512 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992).
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a discretionary function pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) . 64 After a thorough review of perti-
nent case law, the court concluded that United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)365 was
controlling, and the activities of the FAA relating to the
plaintiff were clearly protected as a discretionary activity.
The court did conclude, however, that the FAA had not
provided sufficient information to fully document and
support its claims for penalties and denied the govern-
ment's petition to dismiss this count.3 66
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS
In G. S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Service,
Inc. ,367 the plaintiff developed a modification to the DC-8
aircraft design that enabled it to fly with substantially
heavier loads. He also obtained a Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC) from the FAA regarding this modifica-
tion.368 Discussions thereafter were held between plaintiff
and the defendant to transfer the STC to Kalitta for
$95,000. Prior to this purchase, however, the defendant
decided to copy the Supplemental Flight Manual from
Rasmussen, obtain the appropriate equipment and install
it on a DC-8 aircraft. After doing so, the defendant ap-
plied for and received an airworthiness certificate from
the FAA.
The plaintiff sued for conversion and unjust enrich-
ment. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff had no pro-
tectable property right under state law and his action was
preempted by copyright and patent laws. The appellate
court concluded that copyright and patent laws were not
applicable, but reversed, concluding that without the ef-
forts of the plaintiff, the STC would not have come into
.6 Id. at 519 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988)).
365 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
', Id. at 521.
167 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 124 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1993).
3" See 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1992).
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existence. 369 Thus, plaintiff had a legal claim under Cali-
fornia law to the exclusive use of the STC.3 7 0
In American Airlines v. Christensen3 7 1 the airline sued a
group of travel discount brokers for inducing frequent fly-
ers to sell their awards to the brokers. The court ruled in
favor for the plaintiff concluding that did not violate the
federal antitrust laws 372 and, since there was a "no-sale"
rule within the applicable program, the program was sub-
ject to enforcement by the issuing airline. 73
C. SALES
Meagher v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion 374 concerned a
contract claim regarding the sale of an aircraft by a non-
air carrier to Mexicana Airlines. The aircraft in question
previously had been leased to Delta Airlines for approxi-
mately twelve years and, pursuant to a lease termination
agreement, Delta returned the aircraft after performing a
regularly scheduled and legally required inspection for
structural and mechanical defects ("C" check). Mexicana
entered into a lease with the owner of the aircraft that ex-
pressly disclaimed warranties and representations as to air
worthiness of the aircraft. The only condition mentioned
required the prior lessee, Delta, to perform the "C"
check. Prior to accepting the aircraft, Mexicana had the
opportunity to perform its own inspection and to refuse
acceptance of the aircraft if it determined that the aircraft
was not in the anticipated condition.
The court concluded that the language of the lease
agreement was clear and unambiguous and, as a matter of
law, the interpretation rested with the court.3 75 Since
Mexicana had the opportunity to inspect the aircraft prior
to receipt and failed to detect any conditions that might
369 Rasmussen, 153 F.2d at 903.
370 Id. at 906-07.
371 967 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1992).
372 Id. at 413-14 (citing Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
173 Id. at 414.
37, No. 90 Civ. 7464, 1992 WL 116429 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1992).
375 Id. at *2.
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otherwise have been discovered, amendment of the lease
agreement to make the air worthiness of the aircraft a
condition precedent to enforcement of the contract was
not permitted.376 The fact that Mexicana had operated
the aircraft for approximately 18 months before con-
testing this issue was also considered by the court.377 Ad-
ditional findings, including the dismissal of Mexicana's
tort claims, were made on the basis that Mexicana was un-
able to show privity with Delta and was alleged negligent
misrepresentation was not appropriate under applicable
New York law.378
Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Central Flying Service, Inc. 3 79 involved
the sale of a used Beech Aircraft that subsequently was
determined to be so corroded as to be economically un-
feasible to repair. The purchaser filed suit against the
broker and the previous owner of the aircraft on theories
of breach of warranty, fraud and strict liability. The mat-
ter was submitted to a jury, which found for the defend-
ants on the first two theories and awarded damages under
the strict liability claim. Appeal was taken and the verdict
was affirmed. The court analyzed the law regarding eco-
nomic losses and strict liability claims and concluded that
Arkansas had endorsed the minority view which allowed
such damages. 380 The court further concluded that the
plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence to support the
jury's conclusion that the plane was in a defective condi-
tion and was unreasonably dangerous when it was
purchased.3 8 '
376 Id. at *3.
377 Id. at *1.
371 Id. at *5 (citing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d
110 (N.Y. 1985)).
s79 975 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1992).
310 Id. at 555.
3,, Id.
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X. MISCELLANEOUS
A. NEGLIGENCE
In Albee v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion 382 the plaintiff
instituted suit for injuries that she 'sustained while per-
forming her duties as an employee of a ground services
contractor responsible for cleaning aircraft. Plaintiff al-
legedly was shocked while attempting to connect a vac-
uum cleaner owned by her employer to the aircraft
electrical system. Plaintiff contended that she was entitled
to recover under a negligence theory as well as the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. The court, applying Pennsylvania
tort law, denied recovery, concluding that she had failed
to demonstrate whether the cause of the accident was
something wrong with the electrical system of the aircraft
or whether there was a defect in the vacuum cleaner and/
or its cord and plug. s38 Since she could not rule out negli-
gence on the part of her employer, her cause of action
against the airline was deficient as a matter of law.384
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, California, August 31,
1986 385 involved whether the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress was a cause of action recoverable by indi-
viduals who were on the ground and witnessed the mid-
air collision and subsequent crash. The plaintiffs, Mr. and
Mrs. Di Costa, contended that under California law,
although they did not sustain any physical injuries and did
not witness physical injuries. to closely related victims,
they should be entitled. to present a claim for negligent
infliction based on distress caused by fear for their own
safety rather than injury to another. The event that the
plaintiffs "witnessed" was not the collision itself or the
wreckage from the crash, but rather two loud noises that
apparently were caused by the collision.
The appellate court reversed the district court's dismis-
311 No. Civ. A. 90-6386, 1992 WL 122859 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1992).
.' Id. at *4.
.84 Id. at *5.
3.5 973 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Air Crash Disaster].
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sal of their claim,386 distinguishing the instant cause of ac-
tion from the "bystander" victim theory enunciated in
Thing v. La Chusa.38 7 Citing Christensen v. Superior Court 388
the court held that the plaintiffs should have the opportu-
nity to present evidence demonstrating that by hearing
the two loud noises, they reasonably feared for their own
safety and suffered emotional distress.3 89 A lengthy dis-
sent focused on the conclusion that merely hearing a loud
noise should not be sufficient to constitute a cause of ac-
tion in tort.390
Estrada v. Aeronaves De Mexico, S.A. 39 1 involved yet an-
other claim by a person on the ground at the time of the
mid-air collision above Cerritos, California. The court
concluded that Ms. Estrada was entitled to pursue a cause
of action against the airline and the United States for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional stress. 9 2 The facts indicated
that she did not witness the plane crash into her home, but
she returned minutes later to see that the home was con-
sumed in flames. Further, when she had left the home
minutes earlier she was aware that her husband and two
children were in the house. She returned to see the burn-
ing home, thus she was aware that they were being
injured.
Hasenfus v. Secord393 involved the celebrated "shoot
down" of a civilian aircraft involved in resupplying Nica-
raguan rebels. Richard Secord, a retired Air Force gen-
eral, was sued on the basis that he and his company were
responsible for the "shoot down" in that they did not fully
equip the aircraft with an inertial navigation system so the
aircraft could fly at night. The trial court entered a di-
rected verdict on the basis that the pilot was fully aware of
-"'1 Id. at 1474.
3117 71 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
388 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
3"9 Air Crash Disaster, 973 F.2d at 1493-94.
,-o Id. at 1494-98.
." 967 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1992).
.112 Id. at 1425.
.-', 962 F.2d 1556 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 972 (1993).
AVIATION CASE LA W
the equipment on the aircraft and, even if the organizers
of the mission made certain misrepresentations that in-
duced the pilot to continue flying, this was not the proxi-
mate cause of the "shoot down".394 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the directed verdict.395
B. DAMAGES
Johnson v. Continental Airlines Corp.396 involved the crash
of Continental Airlines Flight 1713 on November 15,
1987, which resulted in the death of twenty-eight persons
with fifty-four other injuries. One of those injured was
the plaintiff. After analyzing choice of law issues, the par-
ties agreed that the law of Colorado would apply to liabil-
ity, and the law of Idaho would apply to damages. The
issue confronted by the appellate court was whether pre-
judgment interest should be awarded under the law of
Colorado or Idaho. The intentions of the plaintiffs were
readily apparent as the law of Idaho did not allow pre-
judgment interest, while that of Colorado did.
The appellate court concluded that prejudgment inter-
est is an element designed to make the plaintiff whole and
should be applied as a component of damages rather than
one of liability. 9 7 In reviewing the Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws3 9 8 for guidance, the court concluded that
while under certain circumstances, distinct issues might
be resolved under the laws of different jurisdictions, it
would reject a smorgasbord approach as advocated by the
plaintiffs. 399 The court reversed and remanded the matter
to the district court with instructions that the law of each
plaintiff's domicile governed the availability of prejudg-
ment interest. 40 0
3- Id. at 1562.
395 Id. at 1563.
3,.6 964 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1992).
397 Id. at 1062 (citing Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988)).
-1118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17 cmt. c (1971).
399 Johnson, 964 F.2d at 1063 (citing Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112
(2d Cir. 1981)).
4- Id. at 1064.
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In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Detroit, Michi-
gan, on August 16, 1987401 involved cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment in which the court provided a detailed
analysis of the legal theories of collateral estoppel, contri-
bution, indemnity and equitable subrogation. The instant
motions were based on the jury verdict and ensuing judg-
ments resolving certain issues between Northwest Airlines
(Northwest) and McDonnell Douglas (MDC). By way of
background, a joint liability jury trial involving personal
injury plaintiffs began, but, before the court reached a
verdict, Northwest and MDC settled with the plaintiffs and
the trial proceeding ultimately ended in a verdict approxi-
mately nineteen. (19) months after jury selection had com-
menced. The jury concluded that the actions on the part
of Northwest were 100 percent of the cause of the acci-
dent. The court entered an order in favor of MDC and
against Northwest on its claims against MDC.40 2
In analyzing the motions for summary judgment, the
court concluded that Northwest had been given and had
taken ample opportunity to litigate and try issues of prod-
ucts liability in the joint liability trial.40 3 Accordingly,
Northwest would be collaterally estopped from relitigat-
ing these factual and legal issues in a claim for the hull
loss. 4 04 Similarly, Northwest's third-party claims against
the manufacturer of a circuit breaker would be precluded
as this component constituted a part of the aircraft that
the jury did not find to have been defective.40 5
Northwest also had made a claim against a car rental
facility that had erected a light pole that was struck by the
Northwest aircraft immediately prior to its impact with the
ground. Applying Michigan law, the court concluded that
the jury's finding that Northwest had engaged in willful
and wanton misconduct was such to preclude Northwest
401 791 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
402 Id. at 1242-43.
403 Id. at 1214-16.
4- Id. at 1216.
4 O Id. at 1217-18.
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from receiving contribution or indemnity from the car
rental facility.40 6 The pending claim for hull damage
against the car rental facility, however, would remain via-
ble, and the court granted Northwest the right to amend
its hull claim to add a nuisance theory of liability. °7
The court also held that MDC was not entitled to contri-
bution for monies it paid to settle the personal injury
claims since the jury had concluded it was not a
tortfeasor. 408 Furthermore, the court concluded MDC
was not entitled to common law indemnity because of the
fact that it paid money to the plaintiffs based on allegations
of fault.4 0 9 Accordingly, it could not be concluded to have
been totally without blame.410 A final attempt at equitable
subrogation was successful for MDC, however, on the
same reasoning that failed in its argument on common
law indemnity.4 1
Malsom v. Lowe 41 2 involved the crash of an aircraft dur-
ing a "Family Fly-In" in Idaho with the death of the plain-
tiffs' decedent, who was a resident of Washington. Suit
was filed by the decedent's parents against the flight in-
structor, a resident of Colorado, in federal court in Wash-
ington. The court subsequently transferred the matter to
the District of Idaho by the court. The plaintiffs con-
tended that Washington's wrongful death statute should
apply. In analyzing the choice of law issue in accordance
with Idaho law, the court concluded that Idaho had the
most significant relationship to the parties, conduct and
issues, and thus, the court would apply Idaho law4 1 3 rather
than the law of Washington or Colorado.
Kirchgessner v. United States414 was a wrongful death ac-
4i" 791 F. Supp. at 1231.
407 Id.
408 Id. at 1235-36.
40., Id. at 1236.
410 Id.
41 Id. at 1237-38.
412 24 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,161 (D. Idaho 1992).
41 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969)).
414 958 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1992).
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tion brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act and ap-
plying, in part, the law of Michigan. The issue arose as to
whether any deduction should be made from the damage
award based on the fact that the decedent would have
paid a certain portion of any income as taxes to the
United States. Since Michigan law allowed recovery for
the loss of financial support the claimant would have re-
ceived from the decedent, the appropriate deduction for
income taxes was in accordance with the state law and
should be allowed.
C. ATrORNEY CONDUCT
In re Magdy F. Anis415 the court reviewed certain "mar-
keting" efforts of two New Jersey lawyers. Mr. Anis, a law-
yer, sent a letter to the father of a passenger who was
killed on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
The court ultimately reprimanded the attorney for the na-
ture of his solicitation, relying both on the fact that it was
offensive and concentrating on the fact that it was mis-
leading in that the attorney set forth certain qualifications
which he did not possess and made comments regarding
other attorneys that could not be proven. While the ap-
propriate ethical rules relate only to New Jersey, the cases
cited herein provide a general review of articles and cases
relevant to improper communication with families follow-
ing an air disaster.
Certain orders in In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on
December 21, 1988416 involved counsel for the plaintiffs
and the United States filing motions for sanctions against
defendant Pan Am and its attorneys for allegedly im-
proper litigation activity. Essentially, each motion con-
tended that the discovery undertaken by Pan Am, the
filing of the third-party complaint against the United
States and certain conduct in regard to the media was suf-
ficient to authorize sanctions against the defendant and its
4- 599 A.2d 1265 (NJ. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992).
416 144 F.R.D. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); 144 F.R.D. 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
AVIATION CASE LA W
counsel. The court presented a detailed analysis in which
it concluded that both motions were premature pending
appellate review of the motion for summary judgment
granted in favor of the United States, and the jury verdict.
Further, the court, citing Coltrade International, Inc. v.
United States41 7 held that the motions needed to establish
with specificity each instance of sanctionable conduct.
The court therefore denied both motions as premature
and granted the parties the opportunity to renew them
following appellate review.
417 973 F.2d 128 (1992).
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